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The European Commission announced in its Data Strategy (2020) its intentions to 
propose an enabling legislative framework for the governance of common European data 
spaces, to review and operationalise data portability, to prioritise standardisation 
activities and foster data interoperability and to clarify usage rights for co-generated IoT 
data. This Strategy starts from the premise that there is not enough data sharing and 
that much data remain locked up and are not available for innovative re-use. The 
Commission will also consider the adoption of a New Competition Tool as well as the 
adoption of ex ante regulation for large online gatekeeping platforms as part of the 
announced Digital Services Act Package1. In this context, the goal of this report is to 
examine the obstacles to Business-to-Business (B2B) data sharing: what keeps 
businesses from sharing or trading more of their data with other businesses and what 
can be done about it?  For this purpose, this report uses the well-known tools of legal 
and economic thinking about market failures.  
 
The economic characteristics of data  
A key economic characteristic of data is non-rivalry:  many parties can use the 
same dataset for a variety of purposes without functional loss to the original data 
collector. Non-rivalry is the fundamental driver of economic welfare gains in data sharing 
or re-use: if one firm collects data that can be used for many purposes, society would 
benefit if other firms could access and use these data. An economic interpretation of non-
rivalry revolves around economies of scope that occur when the same product is re-
used for another purpose. A second source of economic efficiency gains in the use of data 
comes from economies of scope in data aggregation.  When two datasets are 
complementary, more insights and economic value can be extracted from merging them, 
compared to keeping them in separate data silos. Economies of scope should be 
distinguished from economies of scale in data. Both contribute to improving the 
prediction accuracy of datasets.   
Privacy and commercial confidentiality are important for the autonomy of private 
decision-making by firms and individuals and for extracting private value from these 
decisions. Hence, this points at the importance of exclusive data access and control. 
Data are not excludable by nature. They require technical and/or legal protection to 
create exclusive access for one party. From an economic perspective, data sellers should 
have exclusive control over their data. Uncontrolled access will drive prices down to the 
marginal cost of reproduction, often close to zero. Since the law provides few means for 
firms to assert exclusive control rights over data, firms often resort to de facto exclusivity 
by means of contractual or technical protection measures.   
 
Data market failures 
Data may have social value that exceeds their private value. Data collected from 
one group of persons may have predictive value for the behaviour of another group. 
                                           
1 This paper does not prejudge the on-going debate on these policy tools. It is based on currently available 
information in the published Inception Impact Assessments for these policy instruments.  No decisions have 




Aggregated datasets may have more value than segmented sets. This implies an 
inherent market failure in exclusive private control over data and the need to find 
data governance arrangements that find a balance between sharing and exclusivity.  
While economies of scope in data re-use constitute an argument in favour of wider 
access and diffusion of data, economies of scope in aggregation underpin the economic 
benefits of data concentration in large pools. It constitutes an incentive for digital data 
firms to expand their activities to other data-related services markets and build 
conglomerates. It may strengthen their market power because it increases entry barriers 
for new firms and diminishes incentives for innovation. The impact of economies of scope 
in data aggregation on society is ambiguous. Policy makers need to trade off the 
social welfare from increased productivity and innovation against the anti-
competitive market concentration forces at work.  
Apart from the benefits there is also a cost to data sharing and re-use. Private firms may 
incur costs when they share data with parties that can harm their interests. They take 
data sharing decisions in function of the expected benefits and costs. The question for 
policy makers is whether these private data sharing incentives and decisions 
maximise the welfare of society as a whole. A market failure occurs when the private 
value of data remains below its social value. Bridging that gap may require policy 
intervention. Reducing the market power of data holders and facilitating more data 
sharing can be part of the solutions.    
Thus, data sharing is not an objective in its own right. It is a means to achieve 
higher social welfare. Exclusively private data use may lead to underutilisation of data.  
Other parties could make good use of the data but have no access.  Fully shared common 
data pools are subject to overutilization.  When data are freely available to all, there is no 
incentive anymore to invest in data. Intermediate semi-commons data governance 
solutions are more likely to be optimal. Governance regimes, whether private or public, 
can be costly to manage however. Whether they are worth the cost depends on the 
added-value generated by the governance agreement.  
While exclusive access and monopolistic market positions are necessary to extract 
value from data, they are frequently a source of market failure. Monopolistic data 
markets occur when a firm collects data for which there are no close substitutes. 
Whether the firm will allow re-use of the data, inside the firm or by another 
firm, depends on the relationship between the markets for primary and 
secondary use. (i) If the secondary use competes with the first use, for instance for the 
production of a very similar service, it may refuse re-use. (ii) If the secondary service is 
a complement or neutral with respect to the first, the firm has an incentive however to 
promote re-use, either in-house or by another firm. In the latter case it would result in 
data sharing. However, in practice, it is not always a priori clear whether data can be 
used to produce a complementary or a substitute service. This uncertainty may create 
obstacles for data sharing. Still, the monopolistic data firm can charge a monopoly price 
to access the data and apply price discrimination between re-users to maximise his 
profits. The firm may foreclose the market and have an exclusive deal with one firm to 
re-use the data, or buy up the other firm (vertical integration) to produce the second 
service in-house.   
Besides monopolistic market positions, there are other causes of market failure. 
Coordination problems may be an obstacle to re-use. Re-use of the data for the 
production of another service may require complementary inputs that the data-holding 




complementary input. (i) If the latter is available in a competitive market there is no 
problem. (ii) If both the data and the complementary inputs are sold by monopolistic 
firms, an anti-commons coordination problem occurs that requires negotiations between 
the two parties. This may reduce data sharing. Unequal bargaining power between the 
parties may facilitate data sharing but generate equity concerns. Third party 
intermediaries may help to overcome coordination obstacles. If the complementary input 
is another monopolistic dataset, economies of scope in data aggregation may occur if the 
two monopolistic firms agree on data sharing conditions.   
High transaction costs in concluding data sharing agreement may be another obstacle. 
Indeed, data sharing contracts are necessarily incomplete and can lead to privacy and 
security risks and unforeseen outcomes between the contracting parties or with third 
parties. In the absence of ownership rights on data, bilateral data contracts cannot be 
enforced against third parties. Data may spill into the public domain or end up in the 
hands of parties that can cause harm to the original data holder. Such externalities result 
in misalignment of incentives between data collectors and re-users.  
Imperfect and asymmetric information between individuals or small firms and large 
data collectors, which are almost natural states in a data-abundant digital world, distort 
efficient decision making. Re-allocation of data access rights may affect market 
outcomes. Externalities may reduce the value of data protection. Data collected on the 
behaviour of one set of agents has predictive value for the behaviour of others. This 
reduces the marginal value of a single person’s or firm’s dataset and diminishes 
incentives for privacy protection.  
 
Market-based solutions for data sharing 
Solving market failures does not always require mandatory behaviours. Third-parties 
may act as intermediaries and apply new technologies and ways of organising markets in 
order to overcome market failures and enable transactions that were previously not 
feasible. They can be private, public or community organisations that are neutral with 
respect to data uses or they can be active stakeholder in the added-value generated by 
the data. The European Commission’s Data Strategy (2020) calls them “common data 
spaces”. From an economic perspective, they can reduce ex-ante transaction costs and 
ex-post contractual risks, overcome coordination problems, act as commitment devices 
and facilitate self-regulation between private agents, and set interoperability standards.   
Risk reduction is required when none of the participants in a data pool wants other 
parties to have access to their primary data but still wants to benefit from the value of 
the pooled data. Data trusts and industrial data platforms fit this profile. The 
intermediary should be neutral and have no stake in the data or the outcomes of the 
analysis. Overcoming pre-contractual transaction costs requires a more active 
intermediary who has a stake in reaching B2B data deals between providers and re-users 
but has no stake in the contents of the data transfer. Third-party operated B2B data 
sharing platforms may be more successful in closed groups with known participants than 
in open-ended groups of users. Re-use may have negative externality effects on the data 
supplier, or they may miss opportunities. 
Intermediary platforms may also reduce transaction costs because they can contribute 
to standardisation and interoperability of the datasets that are exchanged. Voluntary 
standard setting works when the participants have an incentive to contribute to a 




The absence of standards may also create entrepreneurial opportunities for firms that 
offer private solutions to overcome data market fragmentation and interoperability 
problems. Strong intermediary market players may impose market-driven standards.  
Data holders and re-users may not be able to reach an agreement when they fail to 
capture (and monetise) the gains from data sharing or do not agree on the distribution of 
the gains. Third-party intermediaries may help to overcome these hurdles by offering a 
business model that can capture and monetise the externalities, and by setting 
up a redistribution mechanism. These intermediaries usually become non-neutral and 
more active third parties that have a stake in the value of the pooled data. They may put 
data input providers in a weak bargaining position because they cannot realise the 
economies of scope from data aggregation on their own. In some cases, the benefits of 
data pooling constitute non-excludable public goods, for example pooling of health data 
to improve public health services. This positive externality is difficult to monetise for an 
individual health service provider who therefore has no financial incentive to participate 
in a health data pool. Government intervention may be required to overcome this market 
failure.   
 
Compulsory data portability and access to increase data sharing 
When market-based solution, possible nudged by the State, do not solve market failures, 
a more active intervention from the State imposing data portability and access 
may needed provided the risks of regulatory failures are limited. Such intervention may 
take place ex-post with competition law or ex-ante with regulation. 
Ex-post competition enforcement: If data market failures occur only occasionally, 
competition authorities may be well-placed to address the problem ex-post and on a 
case-by-case basis. There are two possible scenarios: mandating access to data where a 
dominant firm refuses to do so and correcting discriminatory prices or unfair conditions 
for access to data held by a dominant firm.  
First, the so-called essential facilities doctrine is relevant in the case of refusal of 
access to data as a form of abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU. There are some 
restrictions however. A first condition is that the data should be indispensable for the 
production of the alternative service. However, in some cases non-rivalry and wide 
availability of close substitute data may render a dataset non-indispensable. Second, 
access to data for the purpose of producing a service in a market where the dominant 
firm is not yet active itself, falls outside the scope of the essential facilities doctrine as 
currently interpreted in decisions and case law. Yet, these are precisely the scenarios 
that are to be expected in data markets. It may be necessary to adapt these 
conditions to the characteristics of data to enable effective enforcement of data 
access under competition law.   
Second, market failures may also originate when a dominant firm gives access to data. 
Self-preferential access to data may distort downstream services markets. Data 
pricing conditions may be unfair and require redress, for instance through the 
intervention of a neutral third-party intermediary who decides on a fair price. Unfair price 
discrimination may increase social welfare but raise equity concerns in society.     
Once a case has clarified the circumstances under which a refusal to share data amounts 
to abuse under Article 102 TFEU, this may set a precedent to which market players in 




time and the harm may be done before the case can be resolved. This is especially true 
in “winner takes all” markets, where it becomes difficult to contest the incumbent’s 
position once the market has tipped in its favour. Moreover, the design and the 
monitoring of data access remedies are very complex and require an effective 
governance framework. Thus, legislators may decide to set up ex ante regulation for data 
sharing. 
Hybrid and ex-ante regulatory intervention: When market failures occur on a wider 
scale and on a regular basis, it might be necessary for legislators to set ex-ante 
mandatory rules that reduce the exclusive control of data holders. The envisaged New 
Competition Tool would enable a hybrid form of intervention (a mix between ex 
post competition enforcement and ex ante regulation), allowing competition authorities 
to impose remedies, including data access remedies, to address structural competition 
problems in a market without the need to establish a violation of the competition rules.  
The envisaged regulatory instrument for large online gatekeeper platforms would enable 
ex ante regulatory intervention in data markets. Legislators can impose obligations on 
data holders and assign legally binding access rights to stakeholders in the data 
market, ranging from full and exclusive ownership rights to data, to more specific and 
limited rights, such as access and portability rights. The choice of the parties to which 
these specific rights are allocated affects economic outcomes, both in upstream data 
markets and in downstream services markets.  
The EU already has several legislations in place. The EU GDPR allocates specific 
rights to personal data subjects. There are no legally defined rights for non-personal 
data. The Database Directive, the Platform-to-Business Regulation, the Free-Flow of Data 
Regulation, may play a role in B2B data sharing. Consumer law, in particular the Digital 
Content Directive also plays an increasingly important role in allocating data rights to 
consumers. Besides the horizontal regulatory tools, there are sector-specific tools such as 
the Second Payment Services Directive, the Motor Vehicle Regulation and the Electricity 
Directive that affect data sharing in these sectors.  
There are two basic scenarios. (i) When data originators have strong incentives to 
share data with alternative service providers, legislators may grant portability rights to 
the data originator to access and transfer data collected by a data holder. (ii) When data 
originators have no strong incentives, regulators can grant specific data access rights 
directly to data seekers.   
With regard the first scenario, portability rights exist only for personal data under 
Article 20 of the GDPR. The data subject has an inalienable right to ask the data 
processor to retrieve his personal data or to transfer them to a third party.  This creates 
a roundabout B2C2B channel to overcome obstacles to direct B2B data sharing in the 
case of personal data. It can be seen as a tool to facilitate switching and competition, 
and as a fundamental right to empower the data subject at the same time. However, 
there are limitations. It applies only to personal data actively provided or observed by 
the data subject. Data inferred or derived by the data controller are not covered by 
portability rights though they can constitute valuable personal data. Moreover, portability 
is not (yet) sufficiently operational. It defines minimal interoperability requirements but 
was not designed for real time access and process interoperability. It is difficult to apply 
in B2B data sharing settings where time is a critical factor. Additional interventions where 
the necessary infrastructure and interoperability requirements are mandated would be 




There are no legal provisions for portability for non-personal machine data in IoT 
settings. There is no law that establishes an unequivocal legal link between the machine 
or party that collects the data and the party that would have the right to access the data. 
Machine data are often co-generated; several parties can claim access rights. The idea to 
introduce data ownership rights for non-personal data as a way to establish exclusive 
rights has somewhat faded and is now replaced by access rights. However, re-labelling 
the problem does not change the nature of the issue: how to identify the parties that 
could claim control and access rights among several claimants. The allocation of rights 
that maximises social welfare may be perceived as unfair and raise equity concerns for 
disadvantaged parties.    
Portability has several economic effects. It may increase the volume of B2B data 
sharing and reduce the market power of a data holder. Re-users that want to 
collect data via portability incur costs to incentivise portability rights holders to initiate a 
data porting request with their data holder. As a result, economies of scope in data 
aggregation are often weaker for re-users than for the original data holder. That may 
reduce the efficiency of re-use-based services and put them at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to the original data holder. Conversely, data portability may 
strengthen economies of scope in data aggregation when a major market player 
manages to leverage portability rights to collect data from smaller and fragmented 
service providers and aggregate them in a larger data pool that generates efficiencies in 
service production compared to the original holders of fragmented datasets. In such 
cases data aggregation may lead to increased market concentration and efficiency 
losses because of reduced competition.   
With regard the second scenario, B2B data access differs from portability because the 
data originator or holder has no role to play in the data sharing decisions. Sharing can be 
initiated by a designated access rights holder. The problem is to identify these rights 
holders in complex machine data and IoT settings with several stakeholders. For 
non-personal machine-generated data there is not always an obvious “natural” party that 
can claim data access rights. The machine manufacturer is in a privileged position to 
design the machine in such a way that he has exclusive control over the data. In that 
case, it may be better to shift access rights away from machine owners/operators and 
data originators and assign them directly to specific groups of data re-users.  
This raises questions about the decision criteria to grant such rights. Maximizing 
social welfare for society as a whole, and the failure of the market to do so, is a good 
starting point. For example, when data pooling is unlikely to be produced by the market 
because data holders have no incentives to contribute to this pool unless they can 
directly benefit from the insights and services produced by the pooled data. Yet, there 
may be winners and losers from data pooling. This complicates social welfare 
considerations with static equity and welfare-redistribution questions and with dynamic 












The digital transformation generates ever larger volumes of data. Data are not only 
collected, they are also shared and traded between parties. As shown by Everis (2018) 
and IDC and Lisbon Council (2019), markets for data are growing rapidly in many 
domains, from advertising to financial markets, maps and navigation services and many 
other applications. The potential benefits of data sharing and re-use in many applications 
are acknowledged (Ctrl-Shift, 2018; Fingleton and ODI, 2019; Kramer, Schnurr and 
Broughton-Micova, 2020; OECD, 2015 and 2019). Firms are encouraged to engage in 
data sharing, making their data available to other users.  Yet, while data sharing can 
stimulate innovation and ensure a level playing field in competition between firms, it can 
also entail commercial risks and might weaken firms’ incentives to collect data. Finding 
an appropriate balance between opening access to data and keeping them private for 
firms and individuals is one of the most important and complex tasks for modern digital 
societies (Palfrey and Grasser, 2012). Data sharing is not a policy objective in itself but a 
tool to promote economic and social welfare for societies. 
 
The European Commission’s Data Strategy (2020, p 7) starts from the premise that there 
is not enough data sharing and much data remain locked up and are not available for 
innovative re-use. It identifies several obstacles to data sharing, including legal 
fragmentation between EU member states, lack of trust and imbalances in market power 
between businesses, lack of data interoperability and common storage spaces, and tools 
for empowering individuals to exercise their data rights. The Strategy seeks to promote 
business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-government (B2G) data sharing with a wide 
range of legislative and other initiatives, including standards to promote interoperability, 
the creation of data pools, improving portability rights and even changes in competition 
tools with respect to data.  It acknowledges the need to protect and empower individuals 
and firms to exercise their data rights.  
 
The purpose of this report is to inform the Data Strategy with an examination of the 
causes of obstacles to data sharing. What keeps businesses from sharing or trading more 
of their data with other businesses or governments?  For this purpose, this report uses 
the well-known tools of legal and economic thinking about market failures. Data markets, 
and related data-driven services markets, fail when they underperform and do not 
produce the social welfare for all that they could potentially produce because the 
behaviour and incentives of private operators locks markets into an inefficient situation. 
According to the European Commission Better Regulation Guidelines (2017b), public 
policy intervention may be justified when there are market failures, regulatory failures, 
equity concerns or behavioural biases that result in inefficient outcomes that are not in 
the public interest and hold back the overall welfare of society. Policy interventions can 
take various forms, including the use of competition enforcement tools to create a level 
playing field in data-driven markets and regulatory initiatives that facilitate data sharing, 
or make it mandatory.    
 
Of course, there might be other justifications for intervention in data markets than 
market failures. Data interventions can be justified from a fundamental rights 
perspective, as in the case of rights for data subjects in the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR).  As we focus on B2B data sharing, we are dealing either with non-




further sharing. While consented data retain some inalienable fundamental rights 
characteristics, non-personal machine data have no fundamental rights attached. Market 
failures and fundamental rights can however interact. For example, the Data Strategy 
mentions the promotion of user empowerment and self-determination by means of 
personal data portability, a personal data right defined in the GDPR. The portability right 
can affect market outcomes, as we will argue in this report.   
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses the specific economic 
characteristics of data that make data sharing an attractive economic proposition. We 
also discuss the interaction between data markets and markets for ordinary goods and 
services. Section 2 explores different causes of data market failures in B2B data 
interactions between two or more firms. Section 3 examines how some types of data 
market failures may be overcome with third-party intermediaries, data pooling and other 
technological solutions. Section 4 shifts to data market failures that require government 
intervention by means of competition instruments and regulatory policy. Finally, Section 
5 summarises the findings and suggests some ways forwards for policy makers to decide 
on the most appropriate actions to take, depending on the type and source of market 





1. The economic characteristics of data and data markets 
 
1.1. The economic characteristics of data 
Before we dive into data markets and sharing, it is important to explain a few key 
economic characteristics of data that set them apart from ordinary goods and services.   
A crucial economic characteristic of data is non-rivalry2:  many parties can use the 
same dataset for a variety of purposes without functional loss to the original data 
collector (OECD, 2016; Jones and Tonetti, 2019). Rival goods can only be used by one 
party at the time. For example, a car is a rival physical good and can only be used by one 
driver at the time. If a car would be non-rival, all drivers could use the same car at the 
same time to drive to different destinations. The welfare gains would be enormous: it 
would suffice to invest in the production of a single car to cater to the needs of all 
drivers. Non-rivalry is the fundamental driver of economic welfare gains in data sharing 
or re-use: if one firm collects data that can be used for many purposes3, society would 
benefit if other firms could access and use these data. It would result in cost savings for 
society (no need to re-collect the same data by other means, even if feasible). It would 
enable the production of new and innovative data services that the original data collector 
had not envisaged. The primary data collection effort is a sunk cost that can be 
amortised across a large number of uses, rather than remaining confined to a single 
user.   
 
An economic interpretation of the benefits of non-rivalry at the firm level revolves around 
the concept of economies of scope that occur in joint production and (re-)use of 
the same product or asset to produce several outputs (Teece, 1980, 1982; Panzar 
and Willig, 1981). For example, a car manufacturer can re-use the same chassis and 
engines to produce different car models. In this case the advantages of re-use pertain to 
the fixed cost of creating the design for a chassis or engine. Re-use of the same non-rival 
design entails zero marginal re-design costs. However, there is a positive marginal cost 
for the production of additional rival chassis and engines.  More generally, non-rival 
immaterial products, such as proprietary knowledge and digital data, have quasi-zero 
marginal re-use costs because it does not involve re-producing a physical good, only 
copying an electronic data file.  
 
Besides re-use, there is a second source of economic efficiency gains in the use of data:  
economies of scope in data aggregation. When two datasets are complementary, 
more insights and economic value can be extracted from merging them, compared to 
keeping them in separate data silos. This insight can be traced to the economics of 
learning and division of labour. Rosen (1983) observed that when a person has a choice 
between learning two skills, specialisation in one skill is always beneficial when the costs 
of learning both skills are entirely separable.  However, when learning costs are not 
separable and learning one skill decreases the cost of learning another, then there are 
                                           
2 Kramer, Senellart and De Streel (2020) distinguish between the non-rival nature of data and rivalry in the 
means of data collection because key data-collecting services (such as search, or social networking) are 
highly concentrated around a few firms. These data are not ubiquitously available. Both perceptions 
provide economic arguments for data sharing.   
3 To the extent that a single dataset can be used for several purposes, data could be considered as a general-purpose 
technology. However, this re-purposing may not reach the same degree of pervasiveness and cross-sectoral 




economies of scope in learning both skills, provided that the benefits from interaction 
exceed the additional learning costs. Similarly, when two datasets are complementary 
and not entirely separable, applying data analytics (i.e., learning techniques) to the 
merged set will yield more insights and be more productive than applying it to each set 
separately, especially when the marginal cost of applying analytics to an extended 
dataset is small. For example, a targeted advertising service is likely to become more 
efficient in terms of click-through rates and revenue when it has access to consumer data 
that combine a variety of sources including web browsing, financial transaction data, 
mobility data and social media messages. Targeted advertising strategies can be derived 
from each of these datasets separately but the combined dataset will yield more insights 
into consumer preferences. 
 
The benefits of economies of scope in data sharing and re-use by other firms 
may also have a cost side. Palfrey and Grasser (2012) warned that all digital data can, 
in principle, be made interoperable and shareable to the benefit of society. However, 
firms and persons may also suffer from sharing. Neither firms nor individuals want their 
private data to be widely available. Privacy and commercial confidentiality are important 
for the autonomy of private decision-making and for extracting private value from these 
decisions. While non-rival data can be shared without functional losses, sharing may 
entail economic losses for the original data holder. Firms and persons will trade off the 
benefits they expect to receive from sharing (trading) their data against the 
costs they may incur from doing so. Benefits will stimulate private markets for data 
sharing while costs will put a limit on data transactions.  
 
The question for policy makers is whether these private markets maximise the joint 
social welfare of data originators, holders and users. If not, then there is a market 
failure that may require policy intervention. Policy intervention should not seek to 
maximize data sharing because data sharing is not an objective in its own right. It is a 
means to achieve higher social welfare in society. From a market failure perspective, 
policy makers should only intervene when the market is not delivering a social welfare-
maximizing volume of data sharing, considering both the costs and benefits of data 
sharing.   
 
Economies of scope should be distinguished from economies of scale in data.4 A useful 
way to illustrate this is to consider a dataset as a two-dimensional spreadsheet, with the 
number of columns representing the number of variables and the number of rows the 
number of observations on these variables. Statistical analysis can be applied to the 
dataset, for example to use them for prediction purposes. Economies of scale refer to 
increased prediction accuracy due to an increase in the number of rows. Economies of 
scope refer to increased prediction accuracy due to an increase in the number of columns 
or explanatory variables. Adding more columns (variables) is not helpful when they are 
highly correlated or when they are not related at all.   
 
Ordinary goods are excludable by nature. If one person has it, another cannot have it at 
the same time. Data are not excludable by nature because they are non-rival. Two 
persons can have the same data at the same time. In order to sell data, a data holder 
must have exclusive control of the data. If more parties hold the same dataset, 
                                           




competition will drive prices down to their marginal cost of reproduction, often close to 
zero. Excludability can be achieved by technical means. The de facto data holder 
can apply technical protection measures to ensure his exclusive control and access to the 
data. Excludability can also be achieved by legal means. The data holder can negotiate 
a bilateral contract with a buyer or user that specifies data access and use conditions. 
Contracts can be enforced in courts. In some cases, the law grants erga omnes exclusive 
rights. For example, the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)5 grants natural 
persons some exclusive rights to their personal data. The EU Database Directive6 grants 
a conditional sui generis right to makers of databases. These exclusive rights strengthen 
the economic position of the rights holders in data markets – very similar to the position 
of IP rights holders in patent and copyright markets. The law can also grant a set of 
defensive rights, notably if data can be considered as “trade secrets”, as defined in the 
EU Trade Secrets Directive7. 
Data are usually not a final consumer product. They are an intermediary input into the 
production of a service. For example, unless they are aviation aficionados, consumers do 
not search for flight schedules on Google or Skyscanner because they enjoy looking at 
these schedules but because they want to buy an air transport service. Consequently, 
data sharing implies a relationship between an upstream data holder and a downstream 
data-driven service producer who trade or share data between them – unless the two 
roles are combined in a single firm.  
Data sharing is a label that may cover different economic modalities: sharing for 
free, trading for a monetary compensation or in exchange for other data, direct sharing 
of a dataset or indirect sharing of a data-based service only. The latter implies that there 
is no exchange of data between two parties; there is only an exchange of a service based 
on data.  For example, online advertising platforms like Google do not deliver detailed 
consumer data to the advertiser but only an advertising service, based on broad 
targeting criteria. Data have no value on their own. They only become valuable to the 
extent that parties can use them to leverage their position in data-driven services 
markets.    
A peculiar characteristic of data is their social value. Economies of scope in aggregation 
are a first source of social dimension value. Two owners of separate but complementary 
datasets can only achieve a higher value from their data if they collaborate and pool the 
two sets. A second source of social value comes from economies of scale. Once a 
sufficiently large sample of behavioural observations has been compiled to produce 
robust predictions, that can be used to predict the behaviour of agents outside the 
sample8. These social externalities imply an inherent market failure in exclusive private 
control over data. The party that does provide the data is not necessarily the party that 
is affected by their use. The de facto exclusive data holder is not necessarily the party 
that maximizes benefits from the data. An intermediary agent may be required to realize 
                                           
5 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1. 
6 Directive 96/9 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases 
[1996] OJ L 77/20. 
7 Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed 
know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure [2016] 
OJ L 157/1. 




the social externalities from data pooling and turn them into benefits that pay for the 
coordination costs and incentivise individuals to participate in the pool.  
The social value of data brings us to online digital platforms as intermediaries that 
can realize the benefits from economies of scale and scope in data aggregation. 
Data played no role in the first generation of economic models of platforms or multi-sided 
markets9 that were extension of the economics of infrastructure networks. Recent 
platform models have broadened the definition of platforms to firms that bring economic 
agents together and actively promote social externalities between them10. They focus on 
data-driven network effects in platforms that increase the social value of data11. For 
example, platforms can create a searchable catalogue of products or a directory of users 
as a first step in generating that social value. For more efficient matching in complex 
search engines, platforms collect detailed data on buyer preferences and product 
characteristics. For example, Netflix can improve its film title search engine when it 
learns more about user preferences and film characteristics12. Platforms are in a unique 
position as third-party data aggregators to realize economies of scale and scope in data 
aggregation across many users. Individual users cannot realize these social benefits on 
their own.   
The social value of data raises the question which welfare measure should we use to 
assess if there is a gap between private and social welfare?  The mainstream view 
in competition law is to use consumer welfare as the reference point.13 Overall however, 
economics normally uses a wider social welfare measure that comprises of consumer 
and producer welfare, or the combined welfare of all stakeholder groups in society. 
Some competition lawyers would accept this wider view. These two measures can easily 
lead to contradictory conclusions, for example when price discrimination shifts consumer 
surplus to producers or between consumer groups.  Social welfare measures also have 
their problems14. Classic economics rejects the comparison of welfare gains and losses 
between groups or individuals because consumer welfare is assumed not to be 
quantifiable. Alternative approaches accept quantification but open the door to measures 
of welfare improvement whereby some parties gain and others lose15. This raises equity 
concerns.  
 
Another discrepancy in welfare measures may occur when we compare static 
competition scenarios with a dynamic innovation scenario. Static scenarios 
examine the welfare and re-distribution effects of a given market structure and pricing 
strategy, for a given technology. Dynamic scenarios include the impact of future 
                                           
9 Caillaud and Jullien (2003); Parker and Van Alstyne (2005); Rochet and Tirole (2003); Rochet and Tirole (2006). 
10 Franck and Peitz (2019). This definition does avoid the problem of setting a minimum number of market sides; one 
is enough.  
11 Data-driven network effects were first analysed by Prüfer and Schotmüller (2017).   
12 Iansati and Lakhani (2020: ch. 6). 
13 See Motta (2004). 
14 The notion of social welfare can of course be stretched beyond traditional market failures in economics and include 
broader societal issues such as equity and income distribution, the protection of vulnerable groups and 
minorities, and the protection of cultures and political systems.  For example, the protection of liberal 
democracies against fake news and online disinformation or the right to self-determination of citizens in the 
presence of artificial intelligence. 
15 Economics distinguishes between strictly Pareto-improving welfare measures whereby no agent loses welfare.  A 
less stringent welfare improvement criterion is the Kaldor-Hicks criterion whereby agents that lose some welfare 
could by hypothetically compensated by the gains that other agents make.  It does not imply that the 




innovations on the longer-term welfare of citizens.  This is especially important when re-
use and aggregation of datasets can trigger significant innovations.   
 
1.2. The interaction between data collection, use and services markets 
 
Competition lawyers and economists always ask: what is the relevant market? Since data 
derive their value from use in services markets, we have to look at least at two markets: 
data collection and use markets. Firms collect data in a primary market. Data 
originators require incentives in order to share their data with a collecting firm. That firm 
stores and processes the data for onward direct or indirect sales to data-using firms in a 
secondary market. That, in turn, will affect dynamics in data-driven services markets16. 
These markets interact. The willingness of data originators to share data with collectors 
will not only depend on sharing conditions in the primary market but also on subsequent 
use of the data by the collecting firm in the secondary market. For example, the 
willingness of consumers to share their data with a website will depend on the quality of 
services offered by that website to the consumer as well as on how the website will 
subsequently use the data for advertising or other purposes.    
 
Some recent data economics papers have started to look at this two-sided dimension 
of data markets. Jones and Tonetti (2019) use a theoretical macro-economic growth 
model to illustrate the social welfare gains from data sharing. Firms use data to 
increase the efficiency of production and, because of non-rivalry in the use of data, to 
increase the variety of goods and services in the economy. Access to a larger data pool 
will boost the productivity of firms and the number of innovations17, and thereby 
contribute to economic growth and consumer welfare. However, individuals may reduce 
the amount of data that they share because of privacy concerns. Similarly, firms consider 
the impact of sharing their data on competition and innovation – the emergence of close 
substitute products – in their markets. Data hoarding increases the private welfare of 
persons and firms but slows down innovation and economic growth.  
 
Jones and Tonetti (2019) consider several policy scenarios: the optimal degree of sharing 
determined by a benevolent social planner, private sharing decisions by persons and 
firms that get ownership or control rights over secondary use of their data in order to 
alleviate their concerns, and completely outlawing data sharing. (i) If firms own the 
decision rights they will be more willing to selectively share the data they hold. However, 
the volume of data they receive from consumers is substantially diminished because 
consumers fear for their privacy since they have no rights to control the use of their 
personal data in this scenario. (ii) If consumers have control rights they share a larger 
volume of data because they feel more in control. This boosts economic growth. They 
show that allocating data control rights to private persons is superior to 
allocating these rights to firms that trade data.   
 
                                           
16 Of course, there can be vertical integration between these markets. A firm may collect consumer data as a by-
product of its ordinary transactions and use the data in another service market in which it is active.  
17 This is an endogenous growth model. Product variety is the result of increased growth and investment that follow 
in the wake of data availability.  It is not directly the result of increased data availability and the innovation that 




Acemoglu et al (2019) argue that externalities in personal data collection create a 
market failure and diminish the value of personal data in the primary market. In 
the age of artificial intelligence and machine learning, data collected on the behaviour of 
one set of consumers has predictive value for the behaviour of other consumers (Agarwal 
et al., 2018).  This is essentially an “economies of scope in data aggregation” argument. 
Once a firm has accumulated a critical mass of consumer data, the additional insights 
obtained from adding another consumer’s personal data are small, compared to what can 
be learned from data already collected about persons with a similar profile. This reduces 
the marginal value of a single person’s dataset and diminishes incentives for consumers 
to protect their privacy.  That, in turn, increases the supply and decreases the market 
value of personal data.  
 
This could explain the privacy paradox (Acquisti et al, 2016): consumers value their 
privacy but do not invest in protecting it because they understand the low value-added of 
their personal data and the futility of these efforts in the presence of strong spill-overs 
from other consumers’ data. Consumers may not be that sophisticated in their thinking 
and still invest in privacy protection. However, that investment in itself may have a signal 
value that can be exploited against their interests (Dengler and Prüfer, 2018). Moreover, 
re-use of personal data has ambiguous effects on consumer welfare. It can increase 
personal welfare when the data are re-used, for example, by search engines to reduce 
search costs and provide better search results that are more in line with consumer 
preferences. It may reduce welfare when data are re-used for targeted advertising that 
aims to be more persuasive than informative and drives consumers away from their 
original preferences.  
 
While none of these papers presents a two-sided or multi-sided market model for data, 
the multi-sided nature of data markets is implicitly or explicitly present in all these 
models. We therefore conclude from these papers that conditions in the primary data 
collection market have an important effect on the availability of data in the 
secondary market for data re-use, and on data-driven services markets. 
Conversely, re-use conditions will affect the operations of the primary data 
collection market. Data re-use in the secondary firm-to-firm or business-to-business 
(B2B) market can therefore not be considered in isolation from the primary market.   
 
The above-discussed papers focus on the allocation of data ownership and control rights 
to firms and natural persons. However, in practice, there are no legal ownership 
rights on data18, in the EU or elsewhere (Duch-Brown et al., 2017). The EU GDPR 
grants natural persons some inalienable control rights over their personal data. However, 
it does not recognize tradable ownership rights in personal data19 because data 
protection is a non-alienable human right. This sparked a debate on the need to 
introduce such ownership rights, at least for non-personal data (European Commission, 
2017a). This idea has gained very little policy traction so far, mainly because of 
complications regarding the allocation of such rights. Should data originators, collectors 
or processors have such rights? Recent policy reports have shifted the debate to access 
                                           
18 Apart from a limited ownership right on databases, recognised in the EU Database Directive. In addition, data can be 
protected by copyright and/or as a trade secret if it meets the relevant conditions. 
19 Though the EU Digital Services Content Directive has taken some steps towards recognizing that personal data can 
be tradable: Directive 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain 




rights to existing datasets (European Commission 2018a; Drexl, 2018). However, the 
focus on access rights does not fundamentally change the debate. The question still 
remains who should have such rights, and under what conditions?  
 
The EU GDPR allocates personal data rights to the data subject, a natural person who is 
the source of the data. In the case of non-personal machine data generated in industrial 
processes where many parties intervene, the allocation of rights is not self-evident and 
may trigger substantial shifts in added value in the production process. In Internet-of-
things settings, machine data often end up under the de facto exclusive control of one 
party because sensors and machines are designed to achieve that outcome.   
 
In the next section, we explore these questions from the perspective of market failures 
as a benchmark for possible intervention in private data markets.   
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2. Private markets for B2B data sharing and market failures
In this section we focus on B2B data sharing or the market for data re-use and 
aggregation.20  We consider the primary data collection market as exogenous and 
examine possible market failures in the secondary B2B market that might justify a policy 
intervention. A number of recent competition and data policy reports (Crémer et al, 
2019; Furman et al, 2019; Scott-Morton et al, 2019) discuss market failure in secondary 
data markets from the perspective of monopolistic behaviour and competition policy. 
Most of that debate is situated in the context of very large online platforms having a 
strong position in data markets and related data-driven services markets. They may 
leverage data-driven network effects (Prüfer and Schottmüller, 2017) and economies of 
scope in re-use to strengthen their position in adjacent markets or exclude others from 
entering the market. Here we will also start from monopolistic data markets and 
competition-related market failures (Section 2.1). However, we expand the debate and 
look at other causes of market failures too including externalities, lack of incentives for 
the production of non-excludable (public) goods, missing markets, and imperfect and 
asymmetric information (Section 2.2). 
2.1. Monopolistic data markets 
We start from the perspective of a private firm (Firm 1) that collects a relatively scarce 
dataset (D1) for which there are no close substitutes. The firm consequently benefits 
from a monopolistic market position. We assume that Firm 1 uses D1 for the production 
of a service S1 so that the production of D1 and S1 are vertically integrated21. D1 may be 
collected independently of S1, or it may be a by-product of producing S1. For instance, 
consumer data collected while providing an e-commerce or social media service22. We 
assume that D1 can be re-used to produce another service S2 by Firm 1 or by another 
Firm 2 (economies of scope in re-use), or a service S3 that requires aggregation of D1 
with another dataset D2 owned by Firm 2 (economies of scope in aggregation). In order 
for society to realize the social welfare gains from the potential economies of scope that 
D1 could generate, S2 has to be produced by either Firm 1 or Firm 2, and the production 
of S3 requires coordination or collective action between Firm 1 and Firm 2.  
We examine the obstacles that might impede the realization of these economies of scope. 
We start from the incentives that Firm 1 faces to maximize profits from D1, in three 
steps:  
20 See also tow studies done for the European Commission on issues raised in practice by data sharing: Deloitte et al. 
(2018) and VVA (2017). 
21 D1 and S1 can also be carried out by two firms.  That does not fundamentally change the reasoning in this section. 
22 The "by-product" assumption is often invoked to justify open and free access to Firm 1's dataset D1 (OECD, 2016; 
European Commission, 2018), the argument being that it would not have any negative economic impact on F1; 
sales revenue of S1 would continue.  This assumption ignores that F1 would no longer have revenue from selling 
D1 to other firms. It also ignores that D1 sales revenue may have an incentive effect on collecting more data, for 
instance by lowering the price of S1, especially in a two-sided market setting.  Access to D1 by other firms may 
reveal F1's commercial strategies that could be used by other firms to leverage their market share in S1.  It 
assumes that costs are separable and identifiable for main and by-products. This is not necessarily the case. 
Granting mandatory free access rights to D1 eliminates F1's data monopoly rent and dissipates it towards 
downstream data users.  This is sometimes justified as a measure to promote data-driven innovation. It re-




 The impact of the substitution effect between S1 and S2 on the re-use of D1;  
 Data trade or vertical integration between Firm 1 and Firm 2 for the production of S2; 
 The internalisation of externalities from aggregation of D1 and D2, or the benefits 
from coordination between Firm 1 and Firm 2.  
 
(a) The substitution effect in secondary services markets 
 
A first question is whether Firm 1, that produces S1, has an incentive to also 
produce S2 or not. The definition of non-rivalry suggests that the original use is not 
affected by re-use for another purpose. While re-use may not functionally affect original 
use for S1, it may however have an economic impact on the original data collector23. The 
second use can complement, substitute or be neutral with respect to the first.   
 
If S2 is a competing substitute for S124, Firm 1 will try to prevent the production 
of S2 because it undermines the market for its own service S1 (Zhu et al., 2008, 
Jones and Tonetti, 2019)25. For example, car manufacturers will be reluctant to share car 
maintenance data with independent maintenance service providers that compete with 
their own network of official dealers (Martens and Müller-Langer, 2020). Another 
example of competing services is data collected by taxis and public transport service 
providers to manage their user services that could be accessed by competing mobility 
service providers such as e-scooter and ride hailing apps, for instance in the context of 
urban mobility services platforms. They could be used for commercial strategies that 
seek to reduce the number of customers and revenue of the original data collectors 
(Carballa-Smichowski, 2018)26.  
 
If S2 is a complement to S1, Firm 1 has an incentive to facilitate the production 
of S2 because it will increase the sales of S1. For example, car insurance and 
navigation services complement car sales. Car manufacturers have an incentive to use 
data to reduce the costs and improve the quality of these aftermarket services because 
that increases car sales.  
 
                                           
23 In that sense, data are club goods: more users of the data may initially increase the value but too much use may 
negatively affect the value. While they are non-rival, economic value maximisation requires some degree of 
excludability.  Unlimited sharing of non-rival data is not optimal (Bergemann and Bonatti, 2018; Palfrey and 
Grasser, 2012). 
24 Two services are substitutes when a decrease in the price of one decreases demand for the other.  They are 
complements when a decrease in the price of one increases demand for the other. 
25 In the context of the EU database directive and its possible equivalent into US legislation, Zhu et al. (2008) present 
an economic model that explains the conditions that should be attached to re-use of a database. They discuss 
three factors that have played an important role: substantial expenditure for the creation of an original database, 
the extent of functional equivalence between the reused data and the original, and injury for the original creator. 
They translate this into an economic model with three key variables: fixed investment costs for the creator, 
substitutability versus complementarity between the original and reused data, and impact on the revenue of the 
creator and re-user. If the re-use is a complement rather than a substitute to the original, the two parties will not 
compete in the same market and revenue for the creator will not be affected.  
26 This is a standard trade-off in vertical foreclosure settings. Upstream monopolists that aim to foreclose a 
downstream market need to take into account possible positive or negative effects on their upstream market. 
Potential participants in such data sharing platforms need to consider the balance between positive market 
expansion and negative competition effects. The data supplier will have an incentive to refuse data supply unless 
he receives sufficient compensation for potential revenue losses. Both sides may find it individually optimal to 
only partly meet the demands of the other side.  This may result in an overall suboptimal outcome that reduces 




Alternatively, S2 can be neutral with respect to S1, neither a complement nor a 
substitute. For example, mobility data generated by mobile phone service operators can 
be used to enhance city traffic management, a service that does not compete nor 
complement the original use. Selling mobility data for traffic management generates 
purely additional revenue for mobile phone operators.   
 
In conclusion, economies of scope in re-use may not be realised if S1 and S2 are 
close substitutes. This may entail welfare losses for society, especially when 
substitutes would increase competition in downstream service markets. Examples include 
data-driven competition in car maintenance, in payment services and in energy 
distribution markets.  
 
(b) Vertical integration 
 
A second question for Firm 1 is whether to produce S2 in-house or sell access to 
D1 to Firm 2 to produce S2. This is a vertical integration question. The answer 
depends on which option is the most profitable for Firm 1. Since the marginal cost of re-
using D1 for the production of S2 is close to zero, profitability will be determined by the 
monopoly price that Firm 1 can extract from Firm 2 for access to D1. (i) If Firm 2 can 
obtain a substitute dataset D2 for the production of S2, pricing of D1 would have 
to consider the cost of alternative D2. D2 may be an imperfect substitute that produces a 
lower quality service S2 that fetches a lower market price. For example, producers of car 
insurance and navigation services can switch to alternative providers of car navigation 
data, such as mobile phone operators, to produce a competing service S2.  Still, the car 
manufacturer may decide that his own service S1 can compete with S2 and that this 
option is more profitable than selling the dataset D1. Market conditions in the data input 
market as well as the services market will affect pricing strategies for Firm 1's dataset 
D1. (ii) If there is no alternative dataset D2, Firm 1 has a monopoly on an "essential 
facility" for the production of S2 and may price D1 in a monopolistic way. This can lead to 
market distortions discussed extensively in recent competition policy reports (Crémer et 
al, 2019; Furman et al, 2019; Scott-Morton et al, 2019)27.   
 
A profit-maximizing Firm 1 will ration data sales in order to maximize the 
scarcity value of his data. (i) If price discrimination between buyers is not 
possible, Firm 1 may sign an exclusive deal with Firm 2 and foreclose the market for 
other firms that wish to access D1 (Montes et al, 2017). This reduces competition in the 
market for S1 and reduces economies of scope in the re-use of D1. It leads to social 
deadweight losses in both data and services markets. (ii) If price discrimination is 
feasible, Firm 1 may extract all surplus from downstream users of D1, possibly leading 
to equity concerns in the distribution of welfare. There is a growing volume of economic 
research on a variety of data sales and price discrimination strategies to maximize 
revenue for a monopolistic data holder (Bergemann and Bonatti, 2018).      
 
In an extreme case of foreclosure, Firm 1 merges with Firm 2 to produce a joint 
service S2, rather than trade the data. This changes the way in which Firm 1 
monetizes the value of D1, from a sales contract to in-house processing in the merged 
                                           
27 For a more theoretical model of data-driven vertical integration see de Cornière and Taylor (2020).  
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firm. Trade may not be possible because of regulatory constraint, for example because of 
purpose limitations and re-sale constraints imposed on personal data under the EU 
GDPR. Vertical integration may be a way to overcome these regulatory constraints and 
aggregate personal data from various sources.  Vertical integration has pricing strategy 
advantages for the data monopolist and for society. It avoids double marginalization in 
the sequential pricing of D1 and S2 and could lead to more efficient market outcomes for 
consumers of S2. De Cornière and Taylor (2020) study the impact of a merger on the 
primary market - the incentives to invest in collecting D1 – and on competition in the 
secondary market where D1 is re-used for the production of S2. They find that, if data 
trade is not possible, the merger increases consumer welfare because it increases data-
driven competition in the market for S2. If data trade is possible, the merger reduces the 
incentive to collect more data D1 and thereby diminishes competition in the S2 market 
because the quality and/or quantity of data available for use in S2 is degraded compared 
to a situation without data trade.    
There may also be intermediate solutions between selling the data to Firm 2 and 
merging with Firm 2. For example, large online consumer platforms may grant 
temporary and limited data access rights to a potential innovator Firm 2 that claims it 
can use D1 to produce S2. Firm 2 can get a data carve-out inside Firm 1’s server system 
– to avoid data leakage risks – and experiment with the data in the market for S2 for a
limited time period (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2017).  If the innovation is successful, the
two firms may apply a pre-agreed protocol to split the benefits; if it is not successful,
data access is simply closed. The platform may also allow a temporary transfer of data to
Firm 2 to experiment with innovative uses of the data in the development of new
services. In the absence of a prior protocol, the data holder may cut off data access for
the innovator and free ride on the innovation without compensation28.  However, risks of
data leakage and misuse may be high, as the Facebook and Cambridge Analytica case
showed.
(c) The need for complementary inputs
A third question for Firm 1 occurs when the production of S2 requires 
complementary inputs that it does not have. If the market for these 
complementary inputs is competitive, it can buy them to ensure in-house production 
of S2. Even so, there may be fixed costs and economies of scale in these inputs as well 
that lead to market imperfections because acquiring the inputs becomes prohibitively 
costly for Firm 1. In that case, Firm 1 is better off selling D1 to Firm 2 that already has 
these complementary inputs. Fixed costs may thus work both ways. Fixed costs in the 
collection of data may give Firm 1 an advantage in the production of S2. But fixed cost in 
complementary resources may shift these advantages to other firms. This will affect 
switching between internal production of S2 and trading data D1 with another firm for 
the production of S2. Bourreau and de Streel (2019) go back to the economic literature 
on "conglomerates" to show how economies of scope in traditional firms may have 
28 The PeopleBrowsr v. Twitter (Superior Court of the State of California, PeopleBrowsr, Inc. et al. v. Twitter, Inc. 
(PeopleBrowsr), No. C-12-6120 EMC, 2013 WL 843032, N. D. Cal., 6 March 2013) and HiQ v. LinkedIn (United 
States District Court, Northern District of California, hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corporation, No. 17-cv-03301-EMC, 




contributed to firms' expansion of activities in many areas. Economies of scope in data 
re-use may lead to conglomerates in the digital economy. 
 
If the market for the complementary input is monopolistic, a data monopolist and 
a resource monopolist will have to work out an agreement to share their respective 
production factors in order to produce S2. This is generally known in economics as an 
"anti-commons" problem (Buchanan and Yoon, 2000; Schultze et al., 2002). Two parties 
have exclusive rights over resources that need to be combined in order to produce a 
service that is in their common interest. They need to cooperate and negotiate the 
allocation of costs and benefits of combining the resources for the production of S2. This 
leads to strategic behaviour whereby owners try to internalize benefits for themselves 
and externalize costs to others, and results in Nash bargaining that leads to a Pareto-
inferior suboptimal solution because all holders of exclusion rights aim to maximize their 
own profits and set a monopolistic price.  As a result, the combined price is higher than 
the optimal price and the produced quantity is less than under full monopoly by a single 
party. The uncoordinated exercise of exclusion rights leads to under-utilization of data. 
S2 will not materialize, or only in an inferior quality and quantity.  Unless there are 
market-based solutions to overcome this coordination failure, there may be a need for 
policy intervention.   
 
(d) Economies of scope in data aggregation 
 
A specific case occurs when the production of a new service S3 requires 
complementary inputs from D1 and another monopolistic dataset D2 owned by 
Firm 2. This is a typical case of economies of scope in data aggregation. Firm 1 and 2 
need to come to an agreement as a pre-requisite for the production of a joint service S3. 
The resulting coordination problems have been amply discussed in the common and anti-
commons literature. There are many examples that show that private firms and markets 
are often able to overcome the coordination problems to achieve economies of scope in 
data aggregation, sometimes with the help of a third-party intermediary. For instance, 
car manufacturers only have access to navigation data from cars from their own brand, 
not from other brands, which makes it difficult to produce accurate traffic congestion 
maps. Several manufacturers decided to collaborate to share car navigation data in a 
joint navigation service HERE, thereby improving the quality of navigation services 
(Martens and Müller, 2020). Another example comes from health services where Google's 
Deep Mind negotiated access to aggregated consumer data from UK health service 
providers. Although the case is controversial, it is likely that the application of data-
intensive artificial intelligence techniques to the aggregated data may contribute to 
discovering new disease patterns and medical treatments.  
 
While traditional economies of scope in re-use constitute an argument in favour of wider 
access and diffusion of non-rival datasets across many agents, economies of scope in 
aggregation underline the economic benefits of data concentration in large 
pools, as underlined in the European Commission Data Strategy (2020, p 6). The two 
are not mutually exclusive. Accumulating data in large pools requires combining smaller 
datasets. Large data pools do not necessarily imply monopolisation when there are 
several overlapping and competing data pools. Nevertheless, economies of scope in data 




2019). It may also strengthen market dominance because it increases entry barriers for 
new firms and diminishes incentives for innovation (Kramer, Schnurr and Broughton-
Micova, 2020; Prüfer and Schottmüller, 2017). Once a firm has built a strong data 
position in one domain, the marginal costs of expanding into an adjacent complementary 
data domain are lower than for de novo entrants in that domain or incumbents who only 
cover that specific domain. Data-driven indirect network effects may be too strong for a 
new entrant to compete with. McNamee (2019) illustrates how Google expanded its 
search data to adjacent location and mobility data to create maps and navigation 
services, and Facebook appended its social media data with browser cookie and mobility 
data. The value of the aggregated sets exceeds the sum of values of the separate sets.     
 
Schultze et al. (2002) offer some insights into how segmented data markets may 
still achieve collaboration. They explore how differences in supply side cost structures 
and expected net benefits between the participants in an anti-commons game affect 
outcomes. Asymmetric market power and cost structures may lead to more data sharing 
than under the Nash equilibrium predicted by Buchanan and Yoon (2000). A dominant 
data player can offer a share in the additional value generated by economies of scope 
from combining two datasets that exceeds the value that a small player can achieve from 
his own dataset. However, the distribution of added-value between the dominant and 
smaller player may be very unequal. Another solution is the introduction of a third-
party intermediary that ensures the enforcement of commitments agreed between the 
bargaining parties in order to overcome the Prisoner's Dilemma situation.  
 
Yet, there may be situations where inefficient private bargaining or the lack of incentives 
to come to an agreement might justify government intervention to facilitate data access 
and pooling in order to achieve the welfare-enhancing benefits of economies of scope in 
data aggregation. This might be at the expense of a shift in the welfare distribution in 
society: some may gain and others may lose in order to enable the overall gain. If we 
accept this position, then forcing data sharing  on some agents, for the benefit of the 
group becomes a possible policy option.   
 
Economies of scope in data aggregation can have an ambiguous economic 
effects (Lundqvist, 2018; Richter and Slowinski, 2019). It may be an anti-competitive 
force in the data economy if it involves collusion through the exchange of commercially 
sensitive information among competitors. It may turn into abuse of dominance when the 
aggregated dataset is used to anticompetitively leverage market power to the detriment 
of the aggregators in downstream services markets. That may be subject to scrutiny by 
competition authorities under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. At the same time, economies of 
scope in data aggregation can generate productivity and social welfare gains, and 
innovation benefits, for society. For example, pooling detailed medical data from many 
patients and health service providers can increase the productivity of medical research 
and ultimately benefit society as a whole.  Moreover, there can also be re-distributional 
effects. Some consumers and health service providers may experience negative effects 
from the insights produced by data aggregation when the results single them out for 
discriminatory treatment. The results may not be welfare enhancing for all agents29.  
                                           
29 Economics distinguishes between strictly Pareto-improving welfare measures whereby no agent loses welfare.  A 
less stringent welfare improvement criterion is the Kaldor-Hicks criterion whereby agents that lose some welfare 
could by hypothetically compensated by the gains that other agents make.  It does not imply that the 
compensation payments will actually be made.   
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2.2. Other causes of data market failures 
In Section 2.1 we discussed how the market power of the data holder may prevent, 
under some conditions, the realisation of economies of scope in re-use and aggregation 
of data. In this section we bring together other sources of data market failures, such 
externalities, missing incentives for the production of public goods, incomplete contracts 
and risks, transaction costs and missing markets, and asymmetric and imperfect 
information that distort decision making.  These causes are not neatly separated; they 
may overlap and interfere with each other.    
(a) Externalities
Externalities emerge when a decision by one party creates a spill-over of costs and 
benefits to other parties that are not involved in the decision-making. When data 
collected by one party can be freely accessed by others, it results in free riding on the 
efforts of the original collector. This generates positive externality benefits for re-
users and aggregators and may be social welfare-enhancing for all. In a normal 
data trading relationship, the original data collector would expect to appropriate at least 
some of these benefits, for instance by selling the data for a price rather than allowing 
free access. Monetisation (partly) internalizes the externalities. The original data collector 
may depend on monetisation revenue to finance his data collection efforts. Even if data 
collection does not depend on revenue from re-use, firms that collect data in the course 
of their regular business activities may want to explore new ways of monetizing the data. 
For example, mobile phone operators can sell user location data to traffic authorities, car 
navigation services and advertisers. Monetisation of re-use re-distributes benefits 
between collectors and re-users and internalizes the externalities, giving additional 
incentives to data collectors.     
However, some data externalities may be hard to capture and monetize, for 
example in health services.  Data aggregation across private health service providers 
could create a very useful database with strong economies of scope in aggregation for 
the purpose of analysis of disease patterns, to improve the efficiency of health services 
and develop new cures, medicines, prescription policies and public health policies. Yet, 
private data collectors have no incentive to contribute their data for the production of 
these services because they cannot monetise these benefits that spill over to other 
parties. Data aggregation may even generate negative spill-overs for the original data 
collector. For example, the aggregated data could be used for comparing the efficiency of 
private health service providers and increasing competition between them.  Some may 
gain but others may lose. Bearing in mind this risk, health service providers may refuse 
to share their data. Mandatory data sharing would be the only way to overcome private 
disincentives to share data for this purpose and realize the economies of scope in data 
aggregation.     
(b) Incomplete contracts, risks, transaction costs and missing data markets
Dosis and Sand-Zantman (2019) distinguish between contractible and non-contractible 




finite length and can never include provisions for all possible ex-post events or 
unforeseeable events.30 Some contractual provisions may also be unenforceable, non-
monitorable or lack a commitment device. As a result, contracts are subject to the hold-
up problem: parties will try to re-negotiate the contract when an unforeseen or non-
committable event occurs. This includes items like risks from data leaks, or unexpected 
costs and benefits not foreseen in the contract. In traditional contracts, unexpected costs 
and benefits are assigned to the owner of the traded good or service. Since there are no 
legally defined ownership-type of rights for data, this makes it difficult to apply that 
solution. Moreover, bilateral contracts cannot be enforced vis à vis third parties. If data 
leak to a third-party, the original data collectors become exposed again to non-
excludability risks. This may weaken incentives for data sharing.   
 
One solution to incomplete contracts is to appoint a third party to settle the case in such 
an event, usually a judge. This may involve costly court proceedings. A more efficient 
solution may be to assign ownership-type of rights. From an economic perspective, 
ownership rights are residual rights: the costs and benefits of events that are not 
foreseen in a contract or law are automatically allocated to the owner of the residual 
rights. There are no in rem ownership rights in data (Duch-Brown et al., 2017). Debates 
on the possible introduction of such rights (European Commission, 2017a) have faltered 
and attention has now shifted to introducing data access rights (European Commission, 
2018a, Drexl, 2018). Ownership and access rights are complements. The first is a 
residual exclusion right, the second a specific inclusion right. Yet, the question remains 
who should get such rights, if any.   
 
In the absence of legal ownership rights, data are ruled by de facto exclusive 
control. Data holders can use technical protection measures to ensure their exclusive 
use of the data. They may grant use rights to other parties through bilateral contracts. 
These contracts only bind the contracting parties, not third parties. In case of data leaks, 
the data holder has no leverage over third parties that might get hold of the data – 
except in cases where data benefits from intellectual property protection under the 
copyright, sui generis database or trade secret regimes, which offer protection against, 
respectively, reproduction, re-utilisation and unlawful acquisition or use of the protected 
subject matter. These risks may reduce data collectors’ incentives to make data 
available for re-use and be more restrictive in granting data access. The risks of 
contractual hold-up may be too big for holders of valuable or commercially sensitive 
datasets. The Facebook – Cambridge Analytica case has demonstrated the risks of 
bilateral contracting for non-rival data31.  
A related dimension is transaction costs in data exchanges. Negotiating, writing and 
monitoring the implementation of a contract is costly. Writing a contract that foresees all 
possible cases would be infinitely costly. Contracting parties want to limit their 
negotiation and implementation cost. Contracts therefore come inevitably with residual 
uncertainties that can give rise to more costs during monitoring and execution of the 
contract (Williamson, 1985). High transaction costs can especially occur in non-
rival data markets where ex-ante transaction costs and ex-post implementation 
risks can be very high. They can lead to market failure in access to data. The higher 
                                           
30 Also Deloitte et al. (2018). 
31 Facebook was lax in enforcing the contractual agreement with Cambridge Analytica that the data should have 
been deleted, not re-used beyond the agreed timeframe and for other purposes.  Lax enforcement 




the cost of contracting in the market, the more firms will want to circumvent the market 
and keep exchanges in-house (Coase, 1937). Building a protective data wall around the 
firm becomes a private response to data market failures.  However, too much data 
accumulation inside big firms poses competition problems and a new source of market 
failure.   
This can be illustrated with an example from personal data markets. Acemoglu et al 
(2019) argue that the market value of an individual’s personal data is low and depressed 
because of positive externalities in data aggregation across many individuals. The 
aggregator has a large dataset that has predictive value for the profile and preferences of 
individuals who are not in the dataset.  Individuals can protect and refuse to share their 
private data but the aggregator can still target them with advertising because his overall 
profile data are sufficiently accurate, based on predictive data obtained from similar 
individuals who were willing to share their data. The very low and depressed value of 
personal data also explains why natural persons have little incentive to invest in the 
management of their personal data, despite the availability of a variety of tools for the 
purpose. Transaction costs are higher than the potential benefits from personal 
data management. This results in a missing, or at least very much reduced, market for 
privacy and Personal Data Management Services.   
 
(c)  Asymmetric and imperfect information  
 
Imperfect and asymmetric information between individuals and large data 
collectors are almost natural states in a data-abundant digital world. For example, 
online platforms as data aggregators will always have more and better information on the 
services markets that they cover, compared to users of these platforms (consumers and 
sellers). The EU Platform-to-Business Regulation32  requires a platform to inform 
businesses about the extent of access to data that business users or consumers provide 
for the use of the platform’s services or that are generated through the provision of those 
services. Apart from this form of information provision, the Regulation does not offer 
businesses a right to access data. Even if businesses would be offered access to data 
related to their own activities on a platform, this gives them only a subset of the total 
market information that the platform has. It does not restore the informational level 
playing field between platforms and users.  
 
Platforms provide users with search engines and advertising channels to guide the 
matching process between sellers and buyers. Platforms have an interest in increasing 
the efficiency of the matching process because it draws more users to the platforms and 
increases their own revenue. At the same time, they seek to maximize their own profit 
and will distort the available information to achieve that goal. They draw an information 
wedge between the interests of users on both sides of the market to advance their own 
interest as platform operator (De los Santos and Koulayev, 2017). As a result, platforms 
do not necessarily use the available data to optimize the combined social welfare of all 
users and the platform operator. The stronger their market position, the more they may 
distort the information picture.   
 
  
                                           
32 Regulation 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and 




3. Third-party intermediaries to reduce market failures 
 
In the previous section we identified and discussed several sources of market failures in 
B2B data markets where the profit-maximising behaviour of private data holders 
prevents maximising overall social welfare for society – e.g. the combined welfare of data 
holders, potential re-users who could benefit from access to the data, and consumers 
who would benefit from improved services. The next question is: what can be done to 
overcome these market failures? Third-parties may act as intermediaries and apply 
new technologies and ways of organizing markets that will reduce and remedy 
previous market failures and enable transactions that were previously not feasible.  
 
They can be private for-profit firms or non-governmental not-for-profit organisations. 
They can be community-based organisations with a relatively stable group of users who 
participate in decision making, or private entities with variable users who do not 
participate in decision making but is attracted by the services offered. An extensive 
“commons” literature covers the community type (Madison et al., 2016; Bertacchini et al, 
2009). They can also be called “technical enablers” in data sharing (European 
Commission, 2018b). They can be neutral with respect to data uses or they can be an 
active stakeholder in the value-added generated by the data. De Streel and Tombal 
(2020) present a typology of third-party intermediary platforms along two dimensions: 
the degree of active intervention of the third-party and the degree of multi-laterality 
among the participants.  
 
Governments could intervene to create more favourable conditions for market-
based facilitation. The European Commission’s Data Strategy (2020) suggests to put in 
place an enabling legislative framework for the governance of common European data 
spaces in order to facilitate data use, to prioritise standardization activities and to foster 
data interoperability. The Commission also intends to invest in establishing EU-wide 
common, interoperable data spaces with standardisation, appropriate data sharing tools 
and governance frameworks to promote interoperability and data sharing in strategic 
sectors and domains of public interest. Creating common governance institutions implies 
the introduction of third-parties into the data market, legal entities that act as 
intermediaries. In this section we discuss the possibilities and limitations of these 
intermediaries. 
 
From an economic perspective, third-parties can facilitate B2B data sharing between 
firms in several ways. They can (i) reduce ex-ante transaction costs and ex-post 
contractual risks transaction costs, (ii) overcome coordination problems, (iii) act as 
commitment enforcement devices and facilitate self-regulation between private agents, 
and (iv) set interoperability standards.  We can also apply the two interpretations of 
economies of scope that we developed in the previous section to classify third-party 
enablers in two groups:  
 
- those who facilitate vertical interaction between upstream data holders and 
downstream re-users for the production of data-driven services, essentially (i) and 
(iv), 
- and those who facilitate horizontal coordination among data holders for the purpose 





The split between these categories may be a bit artificial but is useful to illustrate their 
roles. In reality, there may be hybrid versions of all these typologies.  
 
3.1. Reducing risk 
 
As already explained, once data holders and re-users have agreed on a contract that 
defines the conditions for access and re-use of data, implementation of the contract 
may entail significant risks. For example, upstream mobile phone operators may 
agree to share data with downstream transport and mobility service providers for the 
purpose of improving traffic and mobility management in a city. The data provider will 
not want to share primary phone user data but only derived mobility indicators at a 
sufficiently aggregate level that protects the privacy of its clients. This does not require a 
third-party intermediary. The simple solution is indirect data sharing whereby the mobile 
phone operator produces the derived dataset that is delivered as a value-added service 
to mobility service provider. However, if the mobility service provider requires pooled 
data from all mobile phone operators in a city in order to create more detailed insights 
than a third-party intermediary may be necessary. None of the data suppliers wants the 
others to access their primary customer data. None of the participants will trust the other 
with collecting the data because each has an interest in getting the full dataset.  Solving 
this problem requires a trusted third-party intermediary who collects the data on his 
server platform, performs the analysis and ensures that only the processed results are 
shared with users.  
 
Data trusts33 and industrial data platforms fit this profile. In order to guarantee 
enforcement, the intermediary should be neutral and have no stake in the data or the 
outcomes of the analysis. That avoids strategic behaviour at the expense of the 
participants.  The intermediary should only receive a fixed remuneration to produce the 
desired outcome. This permits him to act credibly as a trusted service provider for 
contractual commitments.  He can enforce the commitment because he has full control 
over the data and access to the server. That reduces post-contractual risks and 
monitoring costs for the participants.  In this way, neutral third-party intermediaries 
overcome data market failures and enable data sharing transactions that would otherwise 
not materialise because of perceived risks34.   
 
3.2. Transaction costs and standardisation 
 
Post-contractual risk-reduction assumes that contracts have already been agreed 
between data holders and re-users. However, prohibitively high transaction costs may 
occur prior to the signature of a data sharing contract because of search costs for 
appropriate data and partners and the cost of negotiating a contract between the parties. 
Overcoming pre-contractual transaction costs requires a more active intermediary who 
has a stake in reaching B2B data deals between providers and re-users but has no stake 
                                           
33 See also the Open Data Institute on data trusts https://theodi.org/project/data-trusts/  
34 There are many historical examples where third-party intermediaries fulfilled trustee roles in the absence of 
government-supplied commitment and enforcement services and contributed to economic efficiency and growth (for 




in the contents of the data transfer, in order to avoid strategic behaviour by the 
intermediary. Two-sided data market places and single-sided data retailers match 
data supply and demand and fit this profile.  
 
Reducing transaction costs in data markets is not an easy task. One reason can be that 
the intermediary management costs are too high compared to the value of the outcome. 
An example from personal data markets illustrates the problem. The European Data 
Protection Supervisor has advocated the use of Personal Information Management 
Systems (PIMS)35.  Despite many start-ups in this domain, there are no real break-
throughs that have scaled-up to become a significant market player in personal data 
markets. This can be attributed to the fact that the value of personal datasets from 
individual consumers is very low because preferences and behaviour of a specific 
consumer can be inferred from data collected and extrapolated from other consumers 
(Acemoglu et al, 2019). That reduces the marginal opportunity cost of personal data and 
pushes it below the opportunity cost of time and effort involved in managing one’s 
personal data in PIMS. Poor cost-benefit parameters erode incentives for individuals to 
invest in PIMS (Kramer, Senellart and de Streel, 2020:66-73). 
 
Third-party B2B data sharing platforms may be more successful in closed 
groups with known participants than in open-ended groups of users. For example, the 
Hitachi B2B data platform in Copenhagen was not successful because data suppliers were 
reluctant to hand over control over data re-uses to a neutral intermediary platform. Re-
use may have negative externality effects on the data supplier, or they may miss out on 
opportunities to earn more on a data sharing deal. The participants are better off when 
they have negotiated data sharing conditions with each other; they know what they 
signed up to and who with.      
 
Despite all these obstacles to reducing transaction costs, there are positive contributions 
that third-party intermediaries can make to facilitating B2B data sharing deals. Active 
intermediaries may lower pre-contractual transaction costs by proposing standardised 
clauses in data sharing contracts in order to facilitate negotiations. This seems to 
have been the intention of the European Commission in its Staff working document 
(2018b) that proposed non-binding guiding principles for B2B data sharing contracts 
between data holders and downstream users. These include: (i) transparency about the 
entities that can access the data, the type and level of detail, and the purposes for which 
data can be used; and (ii) respect for each other's commercial interests and value 
contribution to the data36. These principles are purely normative guidelines for data 
traders that have no legal value but could become enshrined in data contracts. Default 
clauses and principles reduce the costs and difficulty of negotiating a contract. Standard 
clauses fill a gap in legal provisions regarding data contracts and exchanges. 
 
A question is whether binding legal EU rules are necessary or whether existing general 
contract and commercial law at the national level provide a sufficient basis to address 
                                           
35 https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/our-work/subjects/personal-information-management-system_en  See 
also European Commission (2020, p 18). 
36 Other principles suggested in the SWD, including ensuring undistorted competition enabling portability to minimise 
data lock-in, belong more in the sphere of public policy and do not necessarily align with the interests of private 




uncertainties with regard to B2B data-based transactions. In fact, the problem may be 
the lack of precedent rather than a lack of relevant rules. With regard to the relationship 
between platforms and business users, it is worth referring to the EU Platform-to-
Business Regulation which requires providers of online intermediation services to be 
transparent in their terms and conditions about the access that business users will have 
to relevant data. 37 Even though the Regulation does not prescribe any contractual duties 
or rights, higher levels of transparency can be a starting point to facilitate negotiations as 
well as a basis for determining whether more far-reaching interventions are necessary to 
stimulate data sharing in platform-to-business relations. 
  
Intermediary platforms may also reduce transaction costs because they can contribute to 
standardisation and interoperability of the datasets that are being exchanged.38 
Standards may emerge (i) bottom-up, driven by market forces that create de facto 
standards, (ii) they may be imposed top-down by regulatory authorities, or (iii) they may 
be proposed by entrepreneurial intermediaries that can range from single firms to 
recognised international Standard Setting Organisations (SSOs) that facilitate the 
emergence of standards in a semi-official way. SSOs help to overcome market 
coordination failures (Baron et al, 2019).  
 
Voluntary standard setting works when the participants have an incentive to 
contribute to a standard. For example, in Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) 
participants in the pool gain because their patents are complements. Pooling makes their 
individual patents more valuable, compared to their separate use. Standards may fail to 
emerge when stakeholders have conflicting interests, when their products are competing 
substitutes, or when some key stakeholders are excluded from the negotiations. For 
example, a number of car manufacturers proposed the Extended Vehicle Standard for 
data exchanges between connected cars and aftermarket service users.  The latter where 
excluded from discussions in the standard setting group. The resulting design was 
perceived as being in the interest of the manufacturers as data holders but undermining 
the interests of the data re-users, for instance because they exposed commercially 
confidential re-user information to data holders.  As a result, the re-users refused to 
participate in the coordination exercise (European Commission, 2016).    
 
The absence of standards may also create entrepreneurial opportunities for 
firms that offer private solutions to overcome data market fragmentation and 
interoperability problems. In the automotive sector for example, intermediary data 
market places like Otonomo and Caruso ensure data standardisation and interoperability 
across a large number of manufacturers and service providers. Building appropriate data 
interfaces entails fixed costs that can only be amortised across a large number of 
transactions. This implies that services will not be sold at marginal cost but at some cost 
mark-up.   
 
This mark-up creates some wriggle-room for third-party intermediaries to become 
more active players in the data market and seek to capture a larger share of the 
benefits that they generate as data trade facilitators and transaction cost 
reducers. They have an interest in expanding the market by attracting new data 
                                           
37 Regulation 2019/1150, art.9. 




suppliers and users and consolidating his market power to charge a higher profit margin. 
They can shift from being a one-sided data retailer to becoming a two-sided market 
operator with significant direct and indirect network effects.  Strong intermediary market 
players may impose market-driven standards. This can be illustrated with another 
example from the automotive sector: the rapidly increasing use of Apple iOS and Google 
Android operating systems as driver media interfaces in cars sets a de facto (dual) 
standard for car data formats, as defined by these operating systems. Strong consumer 
demand for these familiar operating systems, also because they facilitate interoperability 
with other consumer devices, puts pressure on car manufacturers to allow them into their 
cars. The more widely interoperable data standards that come along with these operating 
systems may push manufacturers’ own standards out of the market.    
 
3.3. Internalisation and redistribution of externalities 
 
In sections 3.1 and 3.2 we limited the role of third-party intermediaries to reducing 
transaction costs and risks to facilitate data re-use in a vertical relationship between data 
collectors and re-users.  In this section we discuss how third-party intermediaries can 
capture externalities that occur in the wake of economies of scope in data aggregation in 
a horizontal relationship among data collectors.   
 
Data holders and re-users may not be able to reach an agreement when they fail to 
capture (and monetise) the gains from data sharing or do not agree on the distribution of 
the gains. These are typical anti-commons coordination problems: market segmentation 
fails to capture the positive externalities of economies of scope in data aggregation. 
Segmentation may occur because parts of the dataset are controlled by different parties, 
or because data holders and data sources each have their own claims over the data. 
Third-party intermediaries may help to overcome these hurdles by offering a business 
model that can capture and monetise the externalities, and by setting up a 
mechanism for redistribution of the gains to bring on board the parties that feel 
unfairly treated or are at risk of losing out in data sharing.    
 
Search engines are a good example of the role that a third-party intermediary can play in 
capturing the gains from data sharing. We already pointed out that the value of personal 
datasets from individual consumers can be very low because preferences and behaviour 
of a specific consumer can be inferred from data collected and extrapolated from others. 
Consumers are willing to trade them in for search services that are more valuable for 
consumers than their personal data. Search engines subsidise this free search service 
with an advertising business model that captures and monetises a substantial part of the 
externalities that come with the aggregations of low value personal data across many 
consumers (Brynjolfsson, et al, 2019; Acemoglu et al, 2019). The intermediaries are no 
longer neutral players in this setting. They are actively involved in extracting and 
redistributing the gains from data sharing and have a stake in the process. 
 
More generally, intermediaries that process data and extract value-added from 
this processing usually become non-neutral and more active third-parties. For 
example, platform intermediaries can collect relatively low value data inputs from many 
users on one side of the market and aggregate them into large sets from which they can 
extract valuable insights through machine learning, and sell these insights to customers 




position because they cannot realize the economies of scope from data aggregation on 
their own. This may give rise to perceived imbalances in data market power (European 
Commission, 2020, p 12).  
 
The benefits of data pooling are often very difficult to monetise because they 
constitute non-excludable public goods. For example, pooling health data from 
across health service providers may contribute to identifying strategies that can improve 
public health. This positive externality is difficult to monetise for an individual health 
service provider who therefore has no financial incentive to participate in a health data 
pool. This may lead to different responses.  In Finland for example, the government 
intervened to overcome this market failure by making health data sharing 
mandatory for certain private and public health service providers and pooling the data 
in a government agency that makes them accessible to medical researchers who have no 
obligation to share any externality benefits with the data contributors. 39  
 
Alternatively, a third-party may set up a business model that enables the 
monetisation of these benefits and channel at least some of the benefits back to 
the data contributors. For example, in the UK, Google Health Services (DeepMind) 
reached an agreement with a government health services group to access a vast pool of 
personal health data. In return, the medical service provider and patients will benefit 
from improved and free health advisory services provided by Google DeepMind. At the 
same time Google can monetise these non-rival insights by providing paid health 
advisory services to parties that do not participate in the programme (Powles and 
Hobson, 2017). Google Health is not a neutral intermediary between patients and health 
service providers. It has an incentive to monetize these new health services beyond the 
participants in the data pool. The advantage of the Finnish option is that it makes health 
data available to a much larger group of firms and researchers and not a single firm.   
 
Inequality in the pay-off matrix between participants may become an obstacle. For 
example, sharing mobility data between transport service providers in a city may have a 
positive expansion effect but also a negative substitution effect on the revenue and 
market share of data contributors (Carballa-Smichowski, 2018). The net effect may be 
uncertain at the time of decision. In order to bring hesitating participants on board in the 
data pool, an internal compensation and re-distribution mechanism may have to 
be set up. A growing pool of benefits can more easily be re-distributed to compensate 
potential losers: all participants still gain40. Market failure in data aggregation may arise 
from equity concerns in this case.    
 
3.4. The role of third-party intermediaries 
 
We argue in Section 2 that it is unlikely that either exclusively private data use or fully 
shared common data pools are optimal data governance regimes. In most situations, an 
                                           
39 More details regarding the FINDATA Act can be found here https://stm.fi/en/secondary-use-of-health-and-social-
data  
40 In economics jargon:  a technological change may not be strictly Pareto welfare-improving when some participants 
gain while others loose.  It may however be Kaldor-Hicks optimal when the winners could hypothetically compensate 




optimal solution is likely to be somewhere in between. B2B data sharing markets already 
cater to some extent to data sharing demand but they may fail to produce a socially 
optimum amount of sharing, for a variety of reasons explained in Section 2. In this 
section we explored what third-party intermediaries can do to overcome some of these 
market failures. We concluded that there may be some low-hanging fruit that these 
intermediaries can easily collect, such as standardised data formats and 
contracts, acting as a commitment device for the implementation of contracts 
and reducing ex-post risks. They have a harder time overcoming ex-ante transaction 
costs, unless there are economies of scale in these costs.  Third-parties face many 
hurdles related to finding data sharing partners and the negotiation and management of 
complex contracts.   
 
This is the domain of semi-commons or governance agreements that seek to 
overcome the pitfalls of commons – that lead to over-utilisation and under-investment 
and facilitate free-riding – and anti-commons – exclusive private use that leads to 
underutilization and keeps data locked in silos. Smith (2005) argues that semi-commons 
are often costly solutions to overcome the pitfalls of both extreme regimes. Whether they 
are worth the cost depends on the value of the agreement. We give examples where they 
are too costly and fail to overcome the market failure that they try to address.  
 
Smith (2005) discusses the example of US telecommunications infrastructure semi-
commons whereby incumbent telecommunications operators are forced to share their 
non-rival infrastructure with new start-ups at a fixed price. This leads to strategic 
behaviour by incumbents and start-ups and results in underinvestment in infrastructure. 
Getting the price right is a key variable in striking an appropriate balance between 
parties in this semi-commons governance setting. Price setting is handled by a complex 
and costly institutional set-up involving a supervisory authority (third party 
intermediary), courts (third-party dispute settlement), etc. By contrast, giving exclusive 
private property rights is much cheaper to manage – the exclusive owner sets the price – 
and so is the commons – there is no price. Finding more cost-efficient intermediary 
governance systems would open up new B2B data market opportunities, enable the 
emergence of so-far missing markets.  
 
In the next section we discuss government intervention in B2B data markets and 
distinguish between ex post case-based competition interventions and ex ante general 
regulatory interventions. Governments can set up governance structures, as in the case 













4. Competition Law and Regulation to remedy market failures 
 
In Section 3, we outline that third-party intermediaries may contribute to solve market 
failures, by reducing transaction cost and risks, overcoming coordination problems and 
acting as commitment devices between private agents to facilitate the setting of 
interoperability standards, possibly through co-regulation. Yet, that may not be sufficient 
to solve all data market failures and more active public intervention may be necessary. 
This could first be done with competition policy. In this case, competition authorities 
intervene ex post to correct market failures on a case-by-case basis (Section 4.1). 
However, these market failures could occur on a wider scale and on a regular basis, and 
competition law might not be sufficient. In such cases, it might be necessary for 
legislators to set ex ante mandatory rules that reduce the de facto exclusive control of 
data holders and allocate rights to other parties. Legislators may impose obligations on 
data holders and assign legal rights to stakeholders in the data market, ranging from full 
and exclusive ownership rights to data, to more specific and limited access or portability 
rights (Section 4.2). 
 
4.1. Ex post Competition enforcement 
 
If the market failures mentioned above occur only occasionally and can be easily solved, 
competition authorities may be better placed to address these issues on a case-by-case 
basis. As regards the overall goal, the Court of Justice clarifies that the EU competition 
rules are necessary for the functioning of the internal market and seek ‘to prevent 
competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest, individual 
undertakings and consumers, thereby ensuring the well-being of the European Union’.41 
To this end, competition law protects consumer welfare and to contribute to 
internal market integration by intervening against restrictive practices, abusive 
behaviour and concentrations that significantly impede effective competition.42  
 
As regards competition interventions to address data market failures, the two most 
relevant scenarios are interventions in the context of abuse of dominance to mandate 
access to data where a dominant firm refuses to do so and interventions to address 
discriminatory prices or otherwise unfair conditions charged for access to data by a 
dominant firm. 
 
With respect to refusals to give access to data, the so-called essential facilities 
doctrine is relevant. Refusals to deal are a type of abuse of dominance under Article 102 
TFEU. The consequence of a finding of such an abuse is that a dominant firm is obliged to 
enter into dealings with third parties. As such, the essential facilities doctrine mandates 
dominant firms in certain circumstances to provide access to inputs or assets that are 
essential for competitors in order to enter a related market. The doctrine has been 
developed in a long line of cases dealing with access to physical infrastructures as well as 
                                           
41 See for instance Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, par. 22. 
42 We will leave the two branches of EU competition law targeting state aid and public undertakings out of our 
consideration.  
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licensing of intellectual property rights.43 The application of the doctrine to data has been 
a topic of discussion in literature (Colangelo and Maggiolino, 2018; Drexl, 2017; Feasey 
and de Streel, 2020; Graef, 2016) as well as in competition policy reports (Crémer et al, 
2019; Schweitzer et al, 2018). Despite the attention for the issue, no competition 
interventions have occurred so far at EU level to force access to data in order to open up 
data markets in the sense we focus on here. At the national level, competition 
interventions have taken place to force dominant firms to give access to datasets in order 
to enter more traditional markets, including those for the supply of gas44 and lottery 
services45. Although the conditions of the essential facilities doctrine (namely 
indispensability, exclusion of effective competition, new product and absence of objective 
justification) can generally be applied to data, some limitations are worth mentioning.  
First, the non-rivalry and wide availability of data will often render a dataset non-
indispensable as the Commission has concluded in a number of merger decisions.46 
Second, an important restriction in the way the essential facilities doctrine is currently 
interpreted in case law is that there must be ‘leveraging’ by the dominant firm. This 
involves the use of the firm’s dominant position in the market for the input in order to 
gain a stronger position in the related market in which the access seeker wants to 
introduce a new product or service. In previous cases, the EU courts have indeed 
interpreted the condition of exclusion of effective competition in a way that the dominant 
firm must itself already be active in the related market.47 This means that scenarios in 
which access seekers want to use the input for a product or service which is situated in a 
different antitrust market than the one where that the dominant firm is active fall outside 
the scope of the essential facilities doctrine as currently interpreted (Drexl, 2017; Graef, 
2016). Yet, these are the precise scenarios that are to be expected in data markets 
because of the many ways in which data can be used for new purposes. In a growing 
data economy, market players will likely come up with new uses of data going much 
beyond the products and services offered by the holders of data. 
Absent a more expansive interpretation of the essential facilities doctrine, dominant firms 
will thus be able to prevent such new uses of existing datasets by refusing to share data 
with third parties. More generally, the distinct characteristics of data and the competitive 
dynamics of the data economy may require a different balance to be struck between the 
43 See among others Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v. Commission of the European 
Communities (Magill), joined cases C-241/91 and C-242/91, [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:98; Oscar Bronner GmbH & 
Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs, case C-7/97, [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:569; IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health 
GmbH & Co. KG, case C-418/01, [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:257; Microsoft, case T-201/04, [2007] 
ECLI:EU:T:2007:289. 
44 French Autorité de la concurrence, Decision n°17-D-06 (GDF Suez), 21 March 2017, available at 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/17d06.pdf. 
45 Decision 2015-P/K-27 of 22 September 2015 of the Belgian Competition Authority, Stanleybet Belgium/Stanley 
International Betting and Sagevas/World Football Association/Samenwerkende Nevenmaatschappij Belgische PMU 
v. Nationale Loterij.
46 See among others Case COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, 11 March 2008; Case COMP/M.7217 – 
Facebook/WhatsApp, 3 October 2014; Case M.8788 – Apple/Shazam, 6 September 2018. 
47 See Tiercé Ladbroke v. Commission, case T-504/93, ECLI:EU:T:1997:84, par. 133. The case dealt with a refusal by 
organisers of French horse races to provide Ladbroke, who was offering betting services in Belgium, with a 
transmission license for sound and pictures of the French horse races. Apart from the lack of indispensability, the 
General Court held that the condition of exclusion of effective competition was not met because the organisers of 
the French horse races were not competitors of Ladbroke on the relevant market for the provision of betting 




costs and benefits of a competition intervention, possibly calling for a lower threshold to 
be applied to mandating access to data as compared to access to other products.48   
An expansion of the interpretation of the essential facilities doctrine beyond cases of 
leveraging and a lower threshold for the condition of indispensability (as well as new 
product)49 more generally seems feasible, as competition law is flexible and can adapt its 
application to the relevant circumstances of the market. The essential facilities doctrine 
itself has developed over a number of cases in which nuances in the application of the 
conditions were made. Once a precedent is set in which a competition authority or court 
imposes a duty to give access to a dataset based on the essential facilities doctrine, this 
will clarify the extent to which ex post competition enforcement is capable of addressing 
data market failures originating from dominant firms refusing to share data with other 
market players. Even though competition enforcement takes place ex post, it can 
certainly also have an impact ex ante on the future strategy of market players in 
providing access to data they hold.  
Apart from refusing to supply data, market failures may originate in the conditions 
under which a dominant firm decides to give access to data. As evidenced by the 
Amazon investigation that the European Commission opened in July 2019,50 a vertically 
integrated firm may discriminate against competitors by providing its own downstream 
business with preferential access to data. While there are efficiency reasons for a 
vertically integrated firm to keep the use of data on the downstream market to itself, this 
may not be the optimal outcome from a welfare perspective. A competition intervention 
can then address the anticompetitive effects resulting from such forms of self-
preferencing.     
Finally, specific disputes could pertain to one of the conditions under which a 
dominant firm decides to give access to data, namely the price of the access.51 In 
this regard, Drexl (2017) points out that the Huawei52 judgment, where the Court of 
Justice of the EU created a negotiation framework for the licensing of Standard Essential 
Patens on FRAND (Fair Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory) terms53, could be used as 
inspiration for cases of data access. This negotiation framework, applied to data, could be 
the following as explained by Tombal (2020):  Once the access seeker has expressed its 
willingness to pay a fair remuneration for the data, the data holder must present a 
specific written offer specifying the price and the way in which it is to be calculated; It is 
then for the access seeker to respond diligently to that offer in good faith and without 
delaying tactics; Should the access seeker not accept the offer made to it, it has to 
submit to the data holder, promptly and in writing, a specific counter-offer that 
corresponds to a fair remuneration; and Where no agreement is reached on the details of 
                                           
48 See for instance Schweitzer et al (2018) who argue that: ‘There are good reasons to think that, depending on the 
exact setting, the threshold for finding that a refusal to supply data constitutes an abuse may be somewhat lower 
than the threshold for finding an abuse in cases of a refusal to grant access to infrastructures or to intellectual 
property rights. This is true in particular if and to the extent that the refusal to grant access relates to data which 
is generated virtually incidentally and without special investment’. 
49 For a more extensive analysis, see Graef, Tombal and de Streel (2019). 
50 Press release European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission opens investigation into possible anti-competitive 
conduct of Amazon’, 17 July 2019, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_4291. 
51 On the value and the price of data, see also OECD (2013); Feasey and de Streel (2020). 
52 Case C-170/13, Huawei v. ZTE, ECLI:EU:C:2015:477. 




the remuneration following the counter-offer, the parties should, by common agreement, 
request that the price be determined by an independent third party. To set this price, this 
independent third party could, for instance, rely on the “baseball arbitration” mechanism, 
originally used in the USA for baseball salary negotiations.54 According to this 
mechanism, each party proposes a price to the third party, who is tasked with choosing 
the price that appears to be the most “reasonable” under the circumstances of the cases. 
This forces each party to be restrain themselves from proposing unreasonable prices, as 
they know that if they suggest an extravagant price, while the other party suggests a 
more “reasonable” one, the independent third party will pick the other party’s price. A 
variant form is the “night baseball arbitration”, where the independent third party first 
decides itself what could be a reasonable price and then looks at the party’s proposals 
and choses whichever is the closest to the price it first considered. 
Tombal (2020) notes that this independent third party could be the Support Centre for 
data sharing, created in 2019. This Centre could be in a good position to assess the 
appropriateness of the conditions of a data sharing agreement since it is tasked with 
collecting the best practices and existing model contract terms.55 Thus, it should have a 
basis of comparison to assess the prices proposed by both parties. However, as the 
Support Centre for data sharing has been conceived as a recommendation/information 
service, procured by the Commission, on the existing data sharing practices, it would 
likely lack the legal power to impose a price. To do so, an existing regulatory may be to 
have this task or a new body may need to be created, but could nevertheless feed on the 
knowledge accumulated by the Support Centre for data sharing. 
 
The current lack of competition interventions to mandate access to data, and the time it 
will take to clarify the conditions under which refusals to give access to data are abusive, 
may justify looking for remedies beyond ex post competition enforcement. The 
Commission is considering a New Competition Tool allowing competition authorities to 
intervene before a competition law infringement has been established, including for 
mandating access to data. This is a hybrid form of intervention, which lies in between 
ex post competition enforcement and ex ante regulation. However, the future availability 
of such a hybrid intervention in the toolbox of competition authorities does not solve the 
issue of having to establish a threshold for intervention, just as would have to be done 
under the essential facilities doctrine.  
4.2. Ex ante regulation 
 
While reliance on competition law could prove useful to tackle some of the market 
failures identified in Section 2, this regime has its limits. Indeed, competition 
interventions only take place ex post on a case-by-case basis. Litigation may be costly 
and can take a long time to reach a final outcome in courts. Surely, once this outcome 
has been reached, this will inevitably also have an impact ex ante on how market players 
operate. By acting against new types of behaviour for which the application of the rules is 
not yet clear, the boundaries set by the competition authority will also apply to other 
firms, even in other sectors. Such a competition intervention thus sends a signal to the 
market about what behaviour will be accepted. However, this does not prevent the 
undertakings from knowingly acting in a way that infringes competition law and if they do 
                                           





so, the harm may often be done before the case can be resolved. This is especially true 
in “winner takes all” markets, where it becomes extremely difficult to contest the 
incumbent’s position once the market has tipped in its favour. To avoid this, regulators 
can intervene ex ante to anticipate problems. Moreover, regulatory intervention is also 
justified if these market failures occur on a wider scale and on a regular basis and when 
the design and the monitoring is very complex and require an effective governance 
framework that competition law generally does not offer. As explained in Feasey and de 
Streel (2020), this warrants a general or sectoral regulatory policy answer.  
 
Proposals have been made to require market players to share data as an ex ante 
requirement to prevent market tipping, ensure market contestability and 
stimulate innovation (Kramer, Schnurr and Broughton-Micova, 2020; Prüfer and 
Schottmüller, 2017), which are objectives going beyond those underlying competition law 
as such. A suggested modality for such a data sharing framework is to require market 
players to share an amount of data in line with their market share (Mayer-Schönberger & 
Ramge, 2018; Prüfer, 2020).56  
 
As explained in the EU Support Centre for Data Sharing (2020), the EU legal 
framework already contains several rules imposing or encouraging the 
portability and the access of personal and non-personal data. Some rules are 
horizontal and are mainly composed of:  for personal data, the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR)57; for non-personal data, the Digital Content Directive (DCD)58 
applicable in a B2C relationship and the Free Flow of Data Regulation (FFDR)59 applicable 
in a B2B relationship.  Other rules are sectoral and impose data access in particular in: 
the financial sector with Second Payment Services Directive (PSD2) imposing access to 
payment account data, which has been completed in the UK with the Open Banking 
Programme;60 the automotive sector with the new Motor Vehicle Regulation imposing 
access to some vehicle data;61 the energy sector with the new Electricity Directive 




                                           
56 Mayer-Schönberger and Ramger (2018:167): ‘we suggest what we term a progressive data-sharing mandate. It 
would kick in once a company’s market share reaches an initial threshold – say, 10 percent. It would then have to 
share a randomly chosen portion of its feedback data with every other player in the market that requests it. How 
much data it must make available would depend on the market share captured by the company. The closer a 
company is to domination, the more data it would have to share with its competitors’. 
57 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46 (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ [2016] L 199/1. 
58 Directive 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning 
contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services, OJ [2019] L 136/1. 
59 Regulation 2018/1807 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on a framework for the 
free flow of non-personal data in the European Union, OJ [2018] L 303/59. 
60 Directive 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in 
the internal market, OJ [2015] L 337/35, arts.66-67.  
61 Regulation 2018/858 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on the approval and market 
surveillance of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units 
intended for such vehicles, OJ [2018] L 151/1, arts.61-66. 
62 Directive 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal 




Table 1: EU legal framework for data portability and access 
 





- GDPR (2016) 
 
 
- DCD (2019) in B2C 




- Financial: PSD2 (2015) 
- Automotive: Motor Vehicle Regulation (2018) 
- Energy: Electricity Directive (2019)  
 
 
(a) Data portability rights for the data subject 
 
(i) EU regulatory framework on data portability 
 
Portability rights were first established for personal data under the EU GDPR63. 
It creates an unequivocal link between the data controller and data processor and the 
data subject, grounded in data protection as an inalienable human right. The data 
subject holds partial but inalienable rights to these data - no transferable ownership 
rights - including the right to access and delete their personal data, and to port the data 
under the relevant conditions specified in the GDPR.  Data holders face resale and reuse 
restrictions that can only be lifted if they have a lawful basis to do so.64 Indeed, 
according to the purpose limitation principle, personal data can only be processed for 
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes, and cannot be further processed in a manner 
that is incompatible with those purposes.65 This means that data that has been collected 
for a specific purpose cannot be shared with third parties if this act of sharing does not fit 
within this initial purpose. Because the resale or reuse is a new processing activity, 
distinct from the initial one, it requires a new lawful basis.66   
 
The data subject can use her portability rights under Article 20 of the GDPR to 
take the initiative to facilitate reuse. At the request of the data subject, a data 
controller is obliged to transfer the data to the data subject, who can then upload the 
data herself to another data controller, or directly to a third-party controller of the data 
subject’s choice. The latter option only applies in cases where such a direct transfer is 
‘technically feasible’. This opens the door for a roundabout B2C2B way to achieve B2B 
data sharing in the case of personal data. An example of this is the Italian start-up 
                                           
63 As explained above, the GDPR is based on fundamental human rights considerations; it is not a response to a 
perceived market failure in personal data markets.  It does however have an economic impact on data markets. 
64 Article 6 of the GDPR. Consent is only one of these six lawful bases. 
65 Article 5.1.b) of the GDPR. 




company Weople that implements data portability requests on behalf of data subjects in 
exchange for the provision of benefits proportional to the amount and quality of personal 
data transferred to the platform. Weople then merges this information into its own 
database to pursue its own commercial purposes of data enrichment.67  
 
As pointed out by the European Data Protection Board (called Working Party 29 at the 
time) in its guidelines on the right to data portability, Article 20 GDPR aims to strengthen 
the control that the data subjects have on their own personal data, as it represents an 
opportunity to re-balance the relationship between data subject and data controllers, and 
this, by affirming individuals’ personal rights and control over the personal data 
concerning them68. Moreover, the data portability right also empowers data subjects by 
making it easier for data subjects to switch between service providers and thereby 
stimulate competition between service providers (multi-homing in consumer platforms).69 
A similar debate about the character of the right to data portability is present in 
literature. One view is that data portability fits with the fundamental rights nature of the 
data protection regime because it promotes individual control over personal data and 
thus enhances informational self-determination (Lynskey, 2017). Another view is that 
data portability can be better characterised as enabling free flow of data among 
controllers through its use as a tool for individuals to switch where access to data is 
crucial for competition (Drexl, 2017). Discussions about the character of the right to data 
portability are not merely of theoretical value but can impact on how its scope is 
interpreted by data controllers, data protection authorities and courts in practice. This is 
especially relevant for the limitations in the scope of the right to data portability. 
While the GDPR can thus be considered as an appropriate legal instrument to facilitate 
indirect B2B data sharing through portability rights for personal data, a number of 
limitations in the scope of the right to data portability need to be considered as 
pointed by Kramer, Senellart and de Streel (2020). First, the scope of this right is limited 
to specific categories of personal data processing. Indeed, data subjects can only call 
upon their data portability right for processing carried out by automated means, and 
which are based either on the data subjects’ consent or are necessary for the 
performance of a contract.70 There is thus no general right to data portability.  
Moreover, the scope of the right to data portability is limited to certain specific categories 
of personal data because data subjects only have the right to receive the personal data 
concerning them, which they have “provided” to a controller.71 In this regard, the 
European Data Protection Board identifies three categories of personal data and 
                                           
67 In August 2019, the Italian Data Protection Authority asked the European Data Protection Board to provide advice 
on the legality of this use of the GDPR’s right to data portability: 
https://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/9126725.  
68 Working Party 29, Guidelines on the right to data portability, WP 242 rev.01, 13 April 2017, p. 4. 
69 In its first version of its guidelines, the Working Party 29 even indicated that this was the primary aim of this new 
right, as it should facilitate the creation of new services: Working Party 29, Guidelines on the right to data 
portability, WP 242, 13 December 2016, p. 4. However, this indication was deleted in the revised version of April 
2017, which now states that that the main objective of this right is to promote data subject empowerment and 
that the GDPR aims to regulate the processing of personal data, and not to deal with competition law issues. 
70 Article 20(1) of the GDPR. 




considers that only the first two should be considered as data "provided" by the data 
subject.72  
The first category of personal data covered by the right to data portability are “data 
actively and knowingly provided by the data subject”. This includes, but is not limited to, 
an email address, user name, age or any other information that may be provided, for 
example, by completing an online registration form for a service, social network, website, 
etc. 
The second category of personal data covered by this right are “observed data provided 
by the data subject by virtue of the use of the service or the device”. Examples include 
the search history of a data subject, the history of the websites he or she has visited, or 
traffic and location data generated by the use of a mobile application.  
The third category of personal data, namely “inferred data and derived data created by 
the data controller on the basis of the data provided by the data subject” will, on the 
other hand, not be covered by the data portability right. This refers to data resulting 
from a subsequent analysis carried out by the controller on the basis of raw data 
provided (actively or observed) by the data subject, such as user profiles created by the 
controller on the basis of the analysis of data provided by the data subjects, or the 
results of an assessment of the data subject's health based on the health data collected 
by his smart watch73. 
Moreover, as pointed out in Article 20.4 of the GDPR, this right to data portability needs 
to be articulated with the rights and freedoms of others, that it shall not affect. This 
articulation must be done with two categories of data, namely the personal data of other 
data subjects, on the one hand, and data protected by trade secrets or intellectual 
property rights of the data holder, on the other hand. 
Finally, a problem with Article 20 GDPR, with regard to its ability to remedy data market 
failures, is that it is not (yet) sufficiently operational. It defines minimal interoperability 
requirements but arguably does not allow for real time access and does not foresee 
process interoperability and technical compatibility (Crémer et al, 2019; Kramer et 
al. 2020). It is therefore difficult to apply in more dynamic B2B data sharing settings 
where time is a critical factor. This brings us back to the lack of interoperability as a 
source of market failure, as discussed in Section 2.  
 
A question is how far the scope of the right to data portability can be stretched to make it 
more effective as a remedy for data market failures, while staying true to its data 
protection origin. One could argue that existing and more far-reaching sector-specific 
interventions may influence the interpretation of the GDPR in a way that will require real-
time access in sectors where the necessary infrastructure is mandated under sectorial 
law (Graef et al, 2020). However, as suggested by Krämer, Senellart and de Streel 
(2020), additional interventions are likely to be more effective for pursuing objectives 
                                           
72 Working Party 29, Guidelines on the right to data portability, WP 242 rev.01, 13 April 2017, pp. 9-11. 
73 In the interim report published in December 2019 in the context of the market study into online platforms and 
digital advertising, the UK CMA argued that inferred data can nevertheless constitute personal data and be of 
value to users from a data protection perspective and to other parties as well including platforms, advertisers and 
publishers (UK CMA, 2019). Considering the original intention of the EU legislator and the subsequent 
interpretation by the European Data Protection Board, it seems unfeasible to interpret the right to data 
portability in a way that will include inferred data. This is also the case because the GDPR stipulates that the right 
to data portability shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others, which includes the intellectual 




relating to competition and innovation with which data protection authorities have less 
(or even no) enforcement experience and that are not inherently limited to the notion of 
personal data in data protection law. 
 
Next to the GDPR, the Digital Content Directive created a data retrieval right for 
consumers for their non-personal data at the end of a contract. Article 16(4) of 
the Directive provides that, in the event of the termination of a contract for the supply of 
digital content or digital services, the trader shall, at the request of the consumer, make 
available to the consumer any content other than personal data, which was provided or 
created by the consumer when using the digital content or digital service supplied by the 
trader. The consumer is entitled to retrieve that digital content free of charge, without 
hindrance from the trader, within a reasonable time and in a commonly used and 
machine-readable format. This resembles, to some extent, the data portability right of 
the GDPR (Graef, Tombal and de Streel, 2019). 
 
The situation becomes more complex in the case of non-personal machine data in 
IoT settings because there is no law that establishes an unequivocal legal link 
between the machine or party that collects the data and the party that would 
have the right to access the data. There are no inalienable rights to access machines. 
The Regulation on the free flow of non-personal data took a first step to overcome these 
obstacles by suggesting that industry should self-regulate voluntary portability rights for 
non-personal data. This provision is essentially targeting cloud computing service 
providers where the data source is usually uniquely identified and subject to a bilateral 
contract.  It seeks to facilitate switching between cloud service providers.  There are 
many other industrial settings however where the identification of rights holders is not 
straightforward, especially when several parties have supplied data and machines that 
contribute to a production process.   
 
The European Commission (2017a) suggested the introduction of full data ownership 
rights for non-personal data as a means to solve the conundrum of who should get 
access and portability rights. This idea faded when the difficulty of identifying the 
ownership rights holder was acknowledged (Drexl, 2017; Weibe, 2017; Kerber, 2016; 
Zech, 2016). The debate has now shifted to assigning access rights instead of ownership 
rights (European Commission, 2018a, Drexl, 2018). However, the problem of identifying 
the parties that would receive these rights, and the cases in which such an access should 
be granted remains the same. In economics, the Coase Theorem suggests that the initial 
allocation of rights does not matter for economic efficiency when transaction costs are 
low because initial rights can be traded and end up in the hands of the party that makes 
the most efficient use of these rights. There are doubts, however, about the applicability 
of the Coase Theorem to non-rival products like data (Jones and Tonetti, 2019). Social 
welfare increases when more parties can use data at the same time. Splitting an 
exclusive ownership right into several non-exclusive access or use rights may thus be 
more efficient. 
 
(ii) The economic impact of portability 
 
There are already active data trading or data sharing markets, both for personal and 
non-personal data, even in the absence of data access and portability rights (OECD, 
2019). While the data holder seeks to maximize his data revenue, he can ration access to 




affordable for the recipient. He will design a market-based data sharing or trading 
strategy that maximises his private benefits from the data (Bergemann and Bonatti, 
2018). As demonstrated in Section 2, that monopolistic strategy does not maximise the 
volume of data sharing or the social welfare derived from the data unless perfect price 
discrimination is feasible.   
 
The introduction of portability rights increases B2B data sharing between data 
holders and third-party beneficiaries selected by access rights holders, thereby generates 
economies of scope in data re-use. Portability puts the data source or originator at the 
centre of decision-making on data access and re-use. This works well when the data 
originator has an incentive to obtain a data-based service from another party than the 
initial data collector.74 For example, in the automotive sector, drivers may want to port 
their car data to independent service providers because they offer more competitive 
maintenance services than official dealers. Conversely, it does not work well when these 
private incentives are missing.   
 
Data portability may strengthen economies of scope in data aggregation. This 
can occur when a major market player manages to leverage portability rights to collect 
data from fragmented service providers and aggregate them in a larger data pool that 
generates stronger economies of scope and efficiencies in service production than the 
original holders of fragmented datasets. For example, the introduction of Google Android 
and Apple iOS operating systems in digitally connected cars enables service providers in 
this ecosystem to lift data out of car manufacturers’ brand silos and aggregate them 
across many car brands and consumer devices that use identical operating systems. The 
efficiency gains from economies of scope in data aggregation enables the production of 
new and more efficient services for car drivers that individual car manufacturers cannot 
match (Martens and Muller-Langer, 2020). Car manufacturers realise this potential and 
have already initiated cross-brand data sharing to reap the benefits of economies of 
scope in data aggregation, for example in car navigation services.  
 
At the same time, data aggregation may also lead to increased market 
concentration in services and efficiency losses because of reduced competition. 
There are many competing car manufacturers but only a few competitors in car 
navigation services. In this case, the net social welfare impact of data portability thus 
depends on the balance between the positive welfare effects from increased economies of 
scope in data aggregation and the resulting higher service quality and productivity the 
negative welfare effects from market concentration and decreased competition between 
alternative service providers. The net effect is an empirical question that may vary across 
sectors and circumstances.   
 
While portability boosts economies of scope in data re-use, it may not create a 
complete level playing field in economies of scope in data aggregation, because 
the exercise of the right to portability does not automatically imply an obligation for the 
controller to erase the ported data.75 Re-users that want to collect data via portability 
incur costs to incentivise portability rights holders to initiate a data porting request with 
the data holder. Some rights holders will accept the incentive offered; others may not. As 
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a result, the re-user receives only part of the dataset collected by the initial data holder. 
Consequently, economies of scope in data aggregation are weaker for re-users than for 
the original data holder. When these economies of scope are important for the service, 
service efficiency will be lower for re-users. This means that portability cannot completely 
level the playing field between original data holders and re-users, it is an improvement 
compared to a situation with no such right. The question is whether this is sufficient to 
address a possible market failure.   
 
Portability right may also restrict the freedom of the data holder to set a price 
for the data. Following Article 12(5) of the GDPR, actions taken to comply with data 
portability requests have to be provided free of charge by data controllers unless 
requests are manifestly unfounded or excessive, in particular because of their repetitive 
character in which cases the controller may either charge a reasonable fee taking into 
account the administrative costs or refuse to act. A question brought up in literature is 
whether this provision also stands in the way of data controllers charging third parties 
(not data subjects) for licenses to reuse data in their own services (Graef, Husovec, 
Purtova, 2019a). That portability is free of charge for a data subject might not imply that 
reuse of IP-protected data is also automatically free of charge for a third-party controller.  
 
In any case, portability rights re-allocate data rents from the data holder to the 
portability right holder and his third-party beneficiaries. Lower revenue may 
reduce the incentive for the data holder to collect the data or make the necessary 
investments in APIs and minimal interoperability. Even when data are a by-product of 
other operations it may still reduce revenue for the data holder. In a two-sided market 
model, portability may lower market entry costs for data recipients/users but may 
increase entry costs on the data supply side. In retail banking for example it might result 
in higher customer charges for operating a bank account because banks will compensate 
data revenue losses in other ways. 
 
(b) Mandatory data access right for other parties 
  
The GDPR creates an inalienable link between personal data and the data subject as a 
natural person who has rights to access his personal data, irrespective of the legal status 
of the device that was used to collect the personal data. For non-personal machine-
generated data there is no obvious “natural” party that can claim such access 
rights. Many parties may have some sort of claim to access the data: machine owners, 
renters, users, or parties that own the domain where the machine has been working. The 
machine manufacturer can usually design the machine in such a way that he has 
exclusive control over access to the data. The legal status of the machine becomes an 
important issue: Should claims be attached to machine and sensor ownership, to 
machine users, to data originators or processors, or to third parties?  The European 
Commission (2020) announced its intention to clarify data usage rights for co-generated 
data in IoT and machine generated data settings.   
 
The example of agricultural data illustrates the difficulties in this regard (Atik and 
Martens, 2020). A farmer can be the owner or operator of a machine. He can use the 
machine on his own land or on leased land. Operations with the machine can be driven 




the farmer, the machine owner, the machine manufacturer or the land owner. Each of 
these parties may claim access to the data.  Technical Protection Measures and bilateral 
contracts will determine who has access to the data - not by right but by technical and 
economic might. Data access and trading depends on negotiations and market power of 
the contracting parties. Farmers may feel uncomfortable in this situation and reduce their 
demand for data-driven machines (Soto and Gomez, 2019). This explains why EU agro-
industry organisations proposed a voluntary Code of Conduct for data that seeks to 
emulate GDPR-like consent, access and portability rights and assign them to farmers. 76 
However, the code is ambiguous in the identification of the rights holders. It aims to 
attribute these rights to farmers as data originators but allows for the possibility to 
attribute rights to machine owners and operators. Contrary to the GDPR, where data 
subjects have inalienable rights, the Code makes rights tradable and subject to bilaterally 
negotiated contracts clauses and market forces.  
 
Portability does not work well when the data subjects have no private 
incentives to port data to another service provider. In that case, it may be 
better to shift access rights away from data subjects and assign them directly to 
data re-users. This requires mandatory access rights for third-parties. Mandatory B2B 
sharing differs from portability because the data originator has no role to play in the data 
sharing decisions. Sharing can be initiated directly by the data re-user. This regulatory 
solution is appropriate when there are clearly defined social welfare gains to be expected 
while the data holder and originator lack incentives to contribute to these gains. The data 
holder may actually be in a situation where the costs from sharing may exceed his gains. 
In that case legislators or regulators may impose mandatory sharing when the net social 
welfare gains exceed the private costs, although this would entail a welfare re-
distribution from data suppliers to recipients.  
 
For example, in the automotive sector, legislators impose to car manufacturers to 
share basic maintenance information with maintenance service providers and 
ensure open access to the in-car maintenance data socket in order to promote 
competition between authorised dealers and independent service providers.77 
Manufacturers have no incentive to do so because it weakens the market position of their 
franchised dealers.  Consumer welfare gains from competition in maintenance services 
justifies this decision. Other examples include sharing of truck parking information 
between public and private parking operators and transport services providers, and 
sharing of shipping information between fleet operators and port authorities.78   
 
Moreover, portability does not work well when economies of scope in data 
aggregation are important. As explained in chapter 3 on third-party intermediaries, 
market players with strong network effects may sometimes be in a position to make 
attractive service offers to data originators that motivates them to port their data into a 
pool that generate economies of scope in data aggregation. In the absence of 
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aggregators that can offer these incentives, legislators or regulators may create a 
mandatory data pool.  
 
For example, B2B health data pooling is expected to lead to new insights that can 
improve and boost the productivity of health services and benefit consumers. Pooling is 
unlikely to be produced by the market because private health service providers have no 
incentive to contribute to this pool, unless they can directly benefit from these new 
insights. Health service providers may incur costs from pooling (data formatting to 
ensure interoperability, transmission costs) and consumers may fear repercussions for 
their privacy.  In order to overcome this lack of incentives among data sources and 
holders, the Finnish government made health data pooling mandatory both for public and 
for certain private health services providers79, overriding consent requirements for data 
subjects and commercial confidentiality issues for health service providers. Expected 
public welfare gains justify this decision. The government created a data pool operator80 
and an oversight board that can grant public and private researchers access to the data. 
However, in some cases, health data researchers may be in a position to offer benefits to 
health service providers that create private incentives to contribute to the data pool, as 
illustrated by the UK health service sharing data with Google Health Services. The Finnish 
example does not exclude data sharing with private firms that offer direct benefits to the 
contributors. It avoids, however, that private firms would have to negotiate individually 
with health service providers because it gives them direct access to the pool of health 
data.  That facilitates competition between private firms that want to research the data.   
 
Another example is mobility platforms in cities. Public and private transport service 
providers have only weak incentives to share their data with competing service providers 
because it may lead to potentially negative effects on their own business when 
competitors use the data to set up more efficient competition strategies (Carballa-
Smichowski, 2018). Yet, pooling of mobility data may generate economies of scope in 
traffic management and thereby benefit consumers.  Both competition effects and 
economies of scope in data aggregation play a role in mobility platforms.  They require 
data aggregation across all service providers in order to work efficiently.   In order to 
achieve this, mobility service providers may need to be forced by law to contribute data 
to a common pool operator in order to overcome disincentives due to possible negative 
substitution effects between competing transport service providers (Carballa-Smichowski, 
2018). 
 
Provisions for data access more targeted at addressing data market failures exist at 
sectoral level to stimulate competition in services, for example in retail banking and 
payment services, automotive and energy sectors as explained above.  
 
These examples of mandatory data access in order to generate economies of scope in 
data aggregation raise questions about the policy decision criterion. Should it be 
consumer welfare – the benchmark that is commonly used in competition law –, or 
should it be social welfare – the benchmark commonly used by public policy economists?  
Should it be mandatory only in the case of strictly Pareto welfare-improving data sharing 
where no party loses welfare, or should it also apply to data-sharing that increases 
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overall welfare but may involve welfare losses for some parties (Kaldor-Hicks welfare 
improving)? For example, can a car navigation service provider direct cars to certain 
streets in order to find out if the passage is blocked?  While this information is very 
useful for many other drivers, collecting the information imposes a cost on drivers who 
have been directed to these streets and lost time because of road blocks. Can a 
navigation app redirect drivers to secondary streets in order to reduce traffic jams in 
major roads while imposing additional pollution costs on residents along secondary 
streets? These are equity and social welfare re-distribution questions that imply 
a political judgement on the trade-offs between welfare of different groups in 








In Sections 3 and 4, we examine ways in which market failures in B2B data sharing can 
be overcome.  We first look market-based solutions through third-party 
intermediaries that do not require policy intervention, though “soft” government 
enabling actions can facilitate the market. Third-party intermediaries can solve market 
failures when the data sharing parties have an incentive and willingness to move ahead 
with a deal but face obstacles related to transaction costs, risks and coordination 
problems.   
 
We then look at situations where the data holder has no incentive to agree to a deal with 
a data re-user, or may impose monopolistic terms and conditions. In such cases, an 
intervention by the State to remedy these market failures is required. This could first be 
done through the means of competition law. Here, competition authorities intervene ex 
post to correct market failures on a case-by-case basis.  
 
However, these market failures could occur on a wider scale and on a regular basis, and 
competition law might not be sufficient. In such cases, regulators and legislators can 
intervene by imposing duties to share data (including in the form of a hybrid 
intervention through the envisaged New Competition Tool) or by granting mandatory 
data sharing rights, either to the data source (portability right) or to a re-user (access 
right). Beyond the existence of market failures as a justification for policy intervention, 
user empowerment can provide an underlying motivation in particular for improving the 
effectiveness of portability rights and for the introduction of possible new access rights. 
Any of such interventions requires the setting of thresholds or conditions that would 
trigger the application of the obligations. This would involve questions about the type of 
data involved, the addressees of the new rights/duties and the modalities of access. 
Existing regulatory instruments and their limitations can provide inspiration for the 
design of such new interventions. In particular, it is important to map how more 
proactive implementation and enforcement of available regimes can address current gaps 
where data market failures remain without an effective remedy.      
 
Portability implies that the data source can take the initiative to request the 
data holder to transfer the data to the re-user. When legislators make portability 
mandatory, the data holder cannot refuse the request. The EU GDPR grants a portability 
right for personal data.  However, this right has many limitations as the implementation 
modalities remain vague and ill-suited to real time transfers and to overcome 
interoperability problems. There are several examples of more operational sectoral 
portability rights for personal data in the EU, including in banking, automotive and 
energy. The GDPR establishes an unequivocal link between a data collector and the data 
subject as a natural person. For non-personal data such unequivocal links do not exist in 
EU legislation. As a result, the identification of the data source party is more ambiguous, 
and may become complicated in IoT settings where several parties collect and contribute 
data to a data-driven production process.   
 
Portability and access rights can generate economies of scope in data sharing. 
They may be less effective in generating economies of scope in data aggregation, when 




markets can generate these benefits when the parties have an incentive to pool and 
aggregate data because they benefit directly from the aggregation.  
 
However, when the participants obtain no direct benefits from the aggregation, 
mandatory pooling may be necessary to overcome this type of market failure.  
Legislator or regulators may also grant a data access right directly to a re-user, 
without intervention of the data source. If such rights are granted for personal data, 
this requires to comply with the rules of the GDPR, unless the data is anonymised. For 
instance, the re-user needs a lawful basis to re-use non-anonymised personal data. 
Indeed, according to the “purpose limitation principle”, personal data can only be 
processed for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes, and cannot be further processed 
in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes. Moreover, according to the “data 
minimisation principle”, only the adequate, relevant and necessary personal data for the 
fulfilment of a specific purpose can be processed. This lawful basis could be a legal 
obligation created by regulators, which would specify the purposes for which the personal 
data can be accessed and the categories of data covered. For non-personal data, these 
restrictions do not come into play because there are no legal rights over these data. 
Nevertheless, there are as yet only few examples of mandatory access to non-personal 
data. These include access to car maintenance data, truck parking data and energy 
network interoperability data.   
 
We note also that, apart from market failures, data sharing obligations may trigger 
equity concerns. The GDPR contains restrictions on data processing to protect the 
personal data of the data subject, based on the objective of stimulating the free 
movement of personal data as well as the status of data protection as a fundamental 
right. A similar reasoning can be applied to non-personal data where the protection of 
commercial confidentiality is assumed to enhance private and social welfare. There may 
be cases, however, where private and social welfare diverge. A reduction in private rights 
to object to data re-use can increase social welfare, though not necessarily a strictly 
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